The National Law Center for Children and Families (NLC) is a non-profit educational organization with attorneys who specialize in assisting and advising prosecutors and law enforcement agents in issues and cases involving the unlawful distribution of pornography and related speech cases. The legal staff has substantial expertise in the area of Constitutional Law, and has extensive experience in the prosecution of obscenity violations, child sexual abuse, and child pornography in state and federal courts.

47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) states:

47 U.S.C. 230 is a product of the recently enacted Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The Act is the first comprehensive rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934, and has been called a "watershed event" which dramatically changes the "ground rules" for competition and regulation in virtually all sectors of the communications industry. Commentators have observed that by its enactment, Congress has reasserted federal primacy in setting U.S. Communications Policy, and has set a course that clearly adopts competition as the basic charter for all telecommunications markets.

' 230 is a new section of the Communications Act, which:

As set forth in 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2), federal law does not "compel" ICS Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening – rather, '230(c)(2)and ' 230(d)(3) permit, authorize, and protect its use. ' 230(c)(2) invokes powers granted to Congress under the U.S. Constitution, and involves a number of express federal policies. See '230(b). It is designed to encourage wide-spread use of interactive computer services and other interactive media, and to protect the development of U.S. Software Technology, while ensuring, at the same time, vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws dealing with obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. ' 230(c)(2) embodies a Congressional expression of U.S. Communications Policy, and advances and supports implementation of the following compelling federal governmental interests:

1. federal promotion of the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media [see ' 230(b)(1)];

1. federal preservation of the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation [see ' 230(b)(2)] (Emphasis added);
3. federal encouragement of the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services [see ' 230(b)(3)];
4. federal removal of disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material [see ' 230(b)(4)]; and
5. federal promotion and protection of action designed to support and ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer [see ' 230(b)(5)];

With respect to use of filtering software by any ICS provider or user which is authorized under 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2), federal law is clear: the state must defer to the federal statute, because of Supremacy Clause and the operation of federal preemption in this area. Under the federal preemption expressed in 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3), any library, educational institution, or business which offers "interactive computer services" is entitled under federal law to employ a "good faith" decision to use filtering software in connection with its providing Internet access (whether such services are dispensed to adults or children). Because State law must conform to the dictates of the Supremacy Clause, the provisions of 47 U.S.C., ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3), directly authorize an ICS provider or user, acting in good faith, to place filtering software on any and all ICS computers offering Internet access to both adults and children in every State (including all territories and the District of Columbia), and all ICS providers or users are specifically shielded by federal law [see '230(d)(3)] from incurring liability because of such software usage.

With respect to the effect of the Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (cited with approval in Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, at 493 (1957):

Federal law defines an "interactive computer service" as any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions, as well as any non-subscriber system such as those operated by many businesses for employee uses. See 47 U.S.C. ' 230(e)(2), and "Conference Report on the CDA," at p. 194, supra.

All "interactive computer services" are specifically subject to the control of federal law. See 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and "Conference Report on the CDA," at p. 194, supra. Under federal law, it is a crime to use an "interactive computer service" to transmit in cyberspace both obscene material (see 18 U.S.C. '' 1462-1466, '' 1961 et seq.) or child pornography (18 U.S.C. '' 2251-2256), as those terms are defined by federal law. See ' 230(d)(1). Compare, also, "Conference Report on the CDA," at p. 193, supra, ("Section 507 simply clarifies that the current obscenity statutes, in fact, do prohibit using a computer to import and receive an importation of, and transport to sell or distribute, ‘obscene’ material. The amendments made by this section are clarifying and shall not be interpreted to limit or repeal any prohibition contained in sections 1962 or 1965 of title 18, United States Code, before such amendment, under the rule established in United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950)," and "Section 508 would amend section 2422 of title 18 to prohibit the use of a facility of interstate commerce which includes telecommunications devices and other forms of communication for the purpose of luring, enticing, or coercing a minor into prostitution or a sexual crime for which a person could be held criminally liable, or attempt to do so. On July 24, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on online indecency, and child endangerment. The record of this hearing supports the need for congress to take effective action to protect children and families from online harm."). See, also, Reno v ACLU, 521 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (which specifically preempts any federal or state law to the contrary, see 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3), discussed infra), under ' 230(c)(2)(A) no provider or user of an ICS can be held liable on account of "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of" material considered to be "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected" (emphasis added).

There are many considerations which justify the special protections afforded an ICS provider or user by Congress for the voluntary, good faith use of filtering software under 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2). Unlike the provisions of the CDA which were the subject of the Reno decision, 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) does not criminalize or penalize any behavior, or impose by governmental mandate any restrictions regarding the right to access any material sent or received on the Internet on a computer belonging to a private citizen, and reserved for his or her own personal use. ' 230(c)(2) implicitly recognizes already existing "discretionary powers" vested in those who have the responsibility to shape ICS policy for a library, education institution, or business, and under federal law grants additional discretion to these decision-makers to take good faith action in utilizing blocking or screening technology -- an area recognized by Congress to have substantial impact on U.S. Communication Policy. (Superior filtering software systems will never be developed unless they are allowed to be tested and used in a multitude of settings.).

There are substantial differences between a citizen’s use of his or her private, individually-owned computer, and an individual’s use of a computer owned by a library, school, or business. Close supervision of the control and use of "interactive computer services" is difficult, because by definition an ICS provides Internet access to multiple users. '230(c)(2) protects libraries, educational institutions, or businesses in the subjective good faith exercise of their discretion not to become "conduits" for material which is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable."

Under the holding of the Reno case, "speech" on the Internet has the same First Amendment protection as that accorded to "speech" on any other "print medium." Under the Constitutional standard applicable to the regulation of "print mediums," there is no constitutional right or mandate which can force or require a library, educational institution, or business to acquire or provide access to any printed material, including data accessed through the Internet. (A library, educational institution, or business may elect to selectively acquire or limit access to material on the Internet, in the same manner as they are permitted to selectively acquire, remove, or limit access to any other type of "print material"). For example, a library, educational institution, or business is not required to subscribe to Hustler Magazine in order to obtain Time Magazine, and is not required to secure prior court approval before it elects "not to subscribe to" the magazine. It is entitled to exercise its own independent discretion not to acquire Hustler Magazine without being limited by the necessity of engaging in a "prior adversary hearing" to secure an advance judicial determination declaring that Hustler falls within the prohibition of some criminal or civil statute. On the same basis (applying the same First Amendment standards applicable to any other print medium), under ' 230(c)(2) an ICS provider or user is entitled to employ filtering software to prevent the acquisition, exhibition, and distribution of material to which it does not wish to subscribe (because it is objectionable as not falling within the parameters of its "selection policy"), and to restrict access to or availability of material it deems objectionable under the standard set forth in ' 230(c)(2), in the exercise of the discretion granted it under federal and state law.

To hold that the Constitution compels an ICS provider or user to provide complete, open, and unrestricted Internet access would be to place libraries, schools, and businesses in the untenable position of having to disregard their long-standing selection policies relating to the acquisition, retention, and removal of printed materials for their respective collections, and would force them into having to accept any book or magazine offered to them for their use, or place them under an affirmative duty to acquire any book or magazine requested by any patron or employee. There is no such right under the Constitution.

1. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Communications Decency Act

5. The Internet and Online Computer Services.

The portions of ' 230 relevant to the use of filtering software by an ICS provider or user are discussed below.

At 47 U.S.C. ' 230(a), Congress asserts a number of findings relating to U.S. Communication Policy:

1. promote continued development of the Internet and the use of interactive computer services;
2. promote, protect, and remove "disincentives" for the development and use of software technology; as well as
3. ensure support for Federal criminal laws to deter by means of computer:

1. trafficking in obscenity,
2. stalking, and
3. harassment.

47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3) preempts any contrary state law, stating specifically:

47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) states that no ICS provider or user shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. The following constitute compelling interests which provide a legitimate motivation for an ICS provider or user to take action to use filtering software to restrict access or availability of such material:

1. To protect children: The protection of children from exposure to obscene and harmful material is a matter of "compelling" and "surpassing" state interest. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Reno Court’s opinion affirmed the legitimacy and importance of the Congressional purpose in enacting the CDA, the "goal of protecting children from harmful materials." The principle that society has a "compelling interest" in protecting minors from sexually explicit material has been consistently recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (ruling that government may criminalize disseminating sexually explicit harmful material to minors, even though the material may not be obscene for adults. In Ginsberg, the Court held that it was constitutionally permissible to accord to minors a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see, and that such restrictions do not invade the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors. See 390 U.S. at 636-637.

The First Amendment rights of minors are not "co-extensive with those of adults." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J. , concurring). "[A] child...is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-650 (Stewart, J., concurring.) See, also, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (concluding that government may compel broadcasters to refrain from airing indecent sexual material when children are likely to be in the audience or when unconsenting adults may be viewers). In addition, the Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that governmental regulations may also act to facilitate parental control over children’s access to sexually explicit material. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992); and Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).

2. To aid parents and others in the discharge of their primary responsibility for children’s well-being: Parents and others who have the primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to receive the support of laws designed to aid them discharge that responsibility. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra., wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "... constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 390 U.S. 629, at 639.

3. To prevent the creation of a "hostile work environment" and to prevent "discriminatory conduct": Pornography is not protected speech where it acts as "discriminatory conduct" creating a hostile work environment under either federal or state law, since there is no right to make use of even protected speech for purposes of sexual or racial harassment or discrimination. Pornographic displays contribute to the creation of work environments which are "heavily charged" or "heavily polluted" with sexual abuse, which are at the core of the hostile environment theory. There is a compelling interest in cleansing the workplace of impediments to the equality of women, and in eradicating discrimination against women. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628: "[P]otentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact...are entitled to no constitutional protection." See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla, 1991), which observes that the regulation of discriminatory speech in the workplace constitutes a form of "time, place, and manner regulation of speech," and "[B]anning sexist speech in the workplace does not censor such speech everywhere and for all time."

Pornography in the school workplace can create a hostile environment constituting sexual harassment in violation of state and federal civil rights laws. See Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey et al, 122 F.3d 1207 (9^th Cir. 1997) [complaint seeking to hold school officials liable for failure to prevent sexual harassment from two different sources: (1) failure to take steps to prevent inappropriate conduct by a student teacher; (2) failure to take steps to prevent male students in the class from harassing the females, and thereby creating a hostile environment for Plaintiff and her female classmates. Held: school officials were under a duty imposed by Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. (as amended), to prevent sexual harassment of students: "We stress that the issue before us is narrow. We do not consider what steps school officials may reasonably be required to take to prevent harassment by fellow students, and hence do not consider the extent to which such action may differ from the action reasonably expected of employers to prevent harassment by fellow employees. We hold only that the duty to take reasonable steps is clearly established." (Emphasis added). In Oona, R.S., supra, the Ninth Circuit observed: (1) the Equal Protection Clause creates the right to be free from any purposeful sex discrimination by state actors, citing Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29 F.3d 1382 (9^th Cir. 1994) and rejected defendants’ claim of qualified immunity in a section 1983 claim; (2) the United States Supreme Court has analogized the duties of school officials to prevent sexual harassment under Title IX, to those of employers under Title VII, citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

4. To maintain discipline and order, and to limit disruptions in the study or work environment, and to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal and state criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer: There is a compelling interest in maintaining discipline and order within the environs of a library, educational institution, or business, as well as in preserving a study or work environment which is not disruptive and which is not hostile toward any patron, student, or employee, whether male or female. Compare Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1502 (11^th Cir. 1989), and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., supra. Compare, also, Oona, R.S., supra, re the duty to take "reasonable steps" to prevent disruptive behavior in students. The potential exists for interactive computer services to be used in the perpetration of acts which are disruptive, hostile or criminal. See, for example, AP Wire Service report, dated June 30, 1997, reporting: "LAKEWOOD, Ohio (AP) – A man was accused of using the town library’s computer to access an Internet site with pictures of nude boys, loading the images onto a floppy disk. ‘It’s major stuff when you have someone doing this thing in the public,’ city prosecutor Kevin Spellacy said. ‘It heightens the offense and creates in my mind a concern for the public.’" At least one state has elevated the right to a safe school campus to the level of a State Constitutional right. See California Constitution, Article 1, ' 28(a) and ' 28(c). ' 28(a) states: "The People of the State of California find and declare that....public safety extends to public primary, elementary, junior high, and senior high school campuses, where students and staff have the right to be safe and secure in their persons." ' 28(c) states: "All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful."

5. To promote respect for authority and traditional values, be they social, moral, or political: See Pico, supra (lead opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens), 73 L.Ed.2d, at 445: "We are therefore in full agreement ... that local school boards must be permitted ‘to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,’ and that ‘there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political.’" See, also, Pico, supra (opinion by Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment): "It therefore seems entirely appropriate that the State use ‘public schools [to] ... inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’ Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S., at 77, 60 L.Ed.2d 49, 99 S.Ct. 1289." See, also, Pico, supra (dissenting opinion by Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 444 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)), 73 L.Ed.2d, at 461: "[S]chools may legitimately be used as vehicles for ‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’"

6. To exclude material which is "pervasively vulgar" or "educationally unsuitable": "The Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad discretion and management of school affairs. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, supra [262 U.S. 390 (1923)], at 402; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)." Pico, supra, 457 U.S. 853, at 863 (lead opinion by Justice Brennan). See, also, Brennan’s opinion at 457 U.S., at 870-871: "With respect to the present case, the message of these precedents is clear. Petitioners rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. But that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner.... Thus, whether petitioners’ removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners’ actions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. To permit such intentions to control official actions would be to encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette. On the other hand, respondents implicitly concede that an unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the books at issue because those books were pervasively vulgar.… And again, respondents concede that, if it were demonstrated that the removal decision was based solely upon the ‘educational suitability’ of the books in question, then their removal would be ‘perfectly permissible.’... In other words,...such motivations, if decisive of petitioners’ actions, would not carry the danger of an official suppression of ideas, and thus would not violate respondents’ First Amendment rights."

7. To preserve the Right of the Nation and the States to a Decent Society: See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, at 57-60:

47 U.S.C. '230(c)(2) (granting federal protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of objectionable material) resolves what has been a great "legal quagmire." Under ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3), Congress has specifically extended federal protection for the good faith use of filtering software designed to block objectionable material by "interactive computer services." Immunity from suit applies even where there is an intentional blocking of material which is "constitutionally protected" (because under the U.S. Constitution a library, educational institution, or business has the discretion to decide what it will or will not acquire or access using an interactive computer service under its control.) Under 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3), any library, educational institution, or business may block even "protected speech", and is specifically not limited to blocking "only illegal material." The immunity provided by ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3) applies even where there may be a lack of precision in the operation or design of the software program, which results in the unanticipated and unintentional blocking of internet sites.

47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3) address the concern of providers or users of "interactive computer services" (providing Internet access to either adults or children), who would be afraid to use filtering software to prevent or screen the acquisition (or effectuate the removal) of objectionable material accessible through the Internet. Without 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3), threatened by the claim that the use of even the "best available technology" in filtering software "may violate" federal or state law, ICS providers or users would be concerned about incurring potential legal liability, because of the possibility (at this point in the development of filtering technology) that software programs may malfunction and unintentionally screen out (on some random occasion) "unobjectionable" as well as "objectionable" material. Without 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and 47 U.S.C. ' 230(d)(3), libraries, educational institutions, or businesses, not wanting to provide access to materials deemed objectionable for their respective ICS recipient audiences (whether comprised of children or adults), might hesitate to use filtering software to effectuate their discretionary policy decisions regarding whether material is appropriate or inappropriate to be added or retained as a part of their respective collections, because of the allegations that even the good faith use of filtering software might subject them to the substantial burden of having to defend themselves in a law suit over the issue of the propriety of filtering software usage.

There are those who have argued that no filters or blocking devices may be used in connection with "interactive computer services", and that (under this theory) libraries, educational institutions, and businesses have only two choices: they must either provide "complete open access to everything accessible through the Internet," or "no Internet access." However, it is clear under Reno v. ACLU, supra, that the Internet is regulated as a "print medium," and that under "First Amendment print medium standards" there is no constitutional right or mandate which forces any library, school, or business to acquire or retain specific material. Under federal or state law, this is a discretionary material collections decision, vested in the decision-makers who have the duty to make choices and exercise policy decisions with respect to the supervision and control of the library, educational institution, or business. As noted by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in the Pico case (joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor):

It is the application of this same standard (regarding the broad discretion of a library, educational institution, or business to control "mediums of print") to the ICS provider or user under ' 230(c)(2), which compels the conclusion that "interactive computer services" are not required to be the conduit of objectionable material posted by third parties – even where that material constitutes "protected speech." Constitutional considerations relating to "print mediums" authorize and permit the Congressional grant of immunity under ' 230(c)(2) to an ICS provider or user for good faith use of filtering software to screen or block material (which is accessible on the Internet) which is deemed "objectionable" (as that term is defined in ' 230(c)(2)).

By enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress has acted to protect important and compelling federal interests. 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3) represent Congressional authorization of, and provide corresponding federal protection for, ICS Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening. Authority for Congressional action in this area is supported by and derived from grants of power to Congress under the U.S. Constitution. '230 is applicable to all 50 states, and specifically preempts any contrary state or federal law which would impose civil liability for ICS Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening, under the Supremacy Clause. See '230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3).

Any state or federal complaint filed against an ICS provider or user for "any action taken" to "restrict access to or availability of offensive material (as that term is defined under '230)," is subject to a motion to dismiss (under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), or its state counterpart), under the authority of 47 U.S.C. ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3), based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The main issues to be decided on such a motion would be:

1. Does the defendant fall within the statutory definition of an ICS provider or user?
2. Is the suit based upon "any action taken" by the ICS provider or user "to restrict access to or availability of offensive material which the ICS provider or user considers to be "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable"?
3. Was the "action" which forms the basis of the complaint, taken by the ICS provider or user in "good faith"? [Note that "lack of good faith" is a jurisdictional fact, which cannot be generally alleged but must be specifically pleaded, and the existence of which must be established before any lawsuit may be maintained against an ICS provider or user. [The burden of proof for proving that the action was taken in "bad faith" is on the plaintiff who seeks to maintain the action. To hold otherwise would be to effectively vitiate the protection of absolute immunity against being sued which Congress granted to every ICS provider or user under ' 230(c)(2) and ' 230(d)(3) for good faith use of blocking or screening technology].

Dated: March 26, 1998
 
 

This NLC memorandum attempts to highlight and discuss certain prominent legal issues raised by the Good Samaritan Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material by any provider or user of an "Interactive Computer Service," authorized under 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(2), and the federal preemption of any inconsistent state law under '230(d)(3). This review is provided as an educational service to the public and is not meant as personal or specific legal advice or analysis. Legal advice must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of each case and attorney-client guidance must be obtained from personal counsel.
 

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