Critical Issues in Justice and Politics

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Critical Issues in Justice and Politics is a refereed (peer-reviewed) journal which contributes to the theoretical and applied nature of justice and politics. We are a scholarly journal which requires all articles to undergo an extensive review process for both content and format. Our emphasis is on the exchange of qualified material in order to generate discussion and extend the often limited boundaries of scholarly exchange.

Critical Issues in Justice and Politics is sponsored by the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice at Southern Utah University. The editorial board is comprised of faculty from the department as well as select faculty and practitioners from around the United States.

Published twice a year (March and September) *Critical Issues in Justice and Politics* focuses on emerging and continuing issues related to the nature of justice, politics, and policy. A special emphasis is given to topics such as policy, procedures and practices, implementation of theory, and those topics of interest to the scholar and practitioner alike.

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It is the editorial policy of *Critical Issues in Justice and Politics* to accept submissions from all disciplines so long as the material relates to justice and politics. We also encourage submissions from practitioners, students, and others who have an interest in the topics.

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assignment within 10 working days. In most instances an editorial decision may be reached within a month of submission.

Non-refereed materials usually receive attention within the first week of submission. An initial editorial decision is often made within 5 business days.

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Reviewers are asked to evaluate manuscripts on the basis of their scholarly competence as well as the potential contribution to appropriate theory or related areas. Authors may not contact reviewers during the process, and reviewer names are not disclosed unless the reviewer agrees for such disclosure.

Authors who dispute the findings or suggestions of a reviewer may submit their response in writing. Final decisions on publication remain the domain of the editorial board.

For more information or to submit an article or other material for review please see our webpage.

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From the Editor

In our second edition of 2012 we present a variety of scholarly research with a decidedly international flavor, and from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. The authors featured in this edition explore subjects ranging from the rhetoric of Hugo Chavez in Kirk's piece "Father Son and Holy Ghost" to questions of Community/Police Relations in the Philippines in Dauson's exploration of how the Cavite province program of community relations have been implemented. The reader of this edition will find that justice and politics apply in diverse contexts and circumstances.

As always, this edition would not have reached publication without the tireless efforts of Sandi Levy our associate editor—Thanks Sandi!

Since taking the reins as editor of Critical Issues in Justice and Politics and trying to craft an editorial strategy over the last nine months, one thing has become apparent – the questions surrounding Justice and Politics are not limited by borders or intellectual discipline.

As we prepare for our sixth year of publication, I wanted to take some time to lay out the editorial vision that CIJP will focus on. I and the editorial team more broadly remain committed to ensuring that CIJP remains an academically rigorous and yet broadly open journal where scholars from around the world, and from institutions with diverse missions are able to find a publishing home. We continue to believe that the intersection of Justice and Politics provides fertile ground for studies of interest not just to the academic community but also to policy makers, students, and a more general readership.

To achieve these visions, laying out an editorial approach can be useful both for readers, and also for our authors. As always we continue to solicit and accept general research articles that focus in the disciplines of Criminal Justice and Political Science. While these disciplines have and will continue to be our primary focus our editorial vision encourages a wide variety of fields to join the conversation on the pages of CIJP.

We particularly invite scholars of philosophy, economics, public administration and policy, sociology, psychology and others who are exploring these issues to submit manuscripts for publication consideration to broaden the voices addressing these important topics. Over the next year as we work toward greater inclusion of these disciplines we hope that those interested will provide manuscripts, reviews, and their subject area expertise as we explore these important concepts.

Ryan M Yonk, PhD
Editor

THE FATHER, HUGO CHAVEZ, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT POWER FROM ORATORY*

Rachel W. Kirk
Southern Utah University

"Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized."[1]

Hugo Chavez rose to power in large part because of his ability to inspire multitudes of people through the spoken word. He is influential in his own country and far beyond. Chavez's speeches explain how a common man can gain enormous power. This paper provides a brief introduction to the President of Venezuela and his Bolivarian Revolution. Three of his key speeches are examined and are used to analyze possible changes in the way the leader views himself. Last, those trends are compared to the evolution in the rhetoric of presidents in the United States.

Introduction

Hugo Chavez rose to power in Venezuela and has stayed there because of his intelligence, tactics and, perhaps most importantly, because of his oratory. The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of Chavez's discourse in three speeches he gave between late 2006 and early 2009. It will become clear to the reader that Chavez's charisma, discourse, and instinct explain his great influence in the region. After a brief snapshot of Venezuelan history and of Chavez himself, the portrayal of Chavez by the media in the United States will be examined. The following section will examine what others have written about the Venezuelan leader's discourse and style, concentrating especially on what has been written about his victory speech of December 3, 2006. That speech and two others will be analyzed; one speech was given in an atmosphere of defeat and the other, Chavez's recent and, arguably, most jubilant victory speech, given February 15, 2009.

The analysis found in this paper is largely based on stylometric and heuristic methodologies. Heuristics refers to an evaluation technique used for learning and discovery. It is largely a trial-and-error approach used to facilitate problem solving. German sociologist Maximilian Karl Emil used this

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[1] Michel Faucault, "The order of discourse" [L'ordre du discours, 1971]. [Reproduced in Michael Shapiro, ed., *Language and politics*. (New York: New York Press), 1984, 110].

Rachel W. Kirk , PhD, is Assistant Professor of Spanish at Southern Utah University. Her field is Applied Linguistics.

methodology to identify relationships between elements, with the goal of establishing patterns.

Stylometrics is a method used to analyze changes in rhetoric over time. The stylometric method isolates words, phrases, and constructions to uncover patterns that show differences and evolutions in an individual's discourse. While word count alone does not give a complete picture of Hugo Chavez from December 2006 to February 2009, it can be used to demonstrate patterns that, in context, begin to show the evolution of the President of Venezuela and his perspective over that time period. In addition to "patterns of occurrence," I rely on what Charles Young refers to as "rare words,"[2] those words that are interesting because they occur in just one of the three speeches analyzed in this paper. In a more theme-based analysis, the findings discussed in this paper are compared with previous examinations of Chavez's rhetoric. The main goal of stylometrics and heuristics in this paper is to examine Chavez and his evolution over time, through three of his own speeches, given at peak times when his emotions would have been at extreme levels.

The final section of the article describes Lim's analysis of changes in presidential rhetoric in the United States during the twentieth century.[3] The findings presented in this paper mirror the evolution of the rhetoric described by Lim. This leads one to question what Chavez's speeches say about the current state of democracy in Venezuela.

Before diving into Chavez's speeches it is critical to provide a slightly more complete picture of Venezuela's history and politics. Focusing immediately on Chavez's speeches without first providing some background would deprive the reader of the color and dimensions of which the Venezuelan leader is made. Chavez is, if anything, colorful.

A Brief History of Venezuela

It would be negligent to begin a paper about Hugo Chavez without mentioning Simon Bolivar, the great liberator of much of Latin America. Bolivar was born in Caracas in 1783. Prior to his death in 1830 he had been instrumental in liberating the countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela.

As Hawkins points out, Bolivar's efforts to free Latin America did not save it from exploitation. The bulk of the population is at the bottom of the

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[2] Charles Young, "Plato and Computer Dating." *Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, 12* (1994).

[3] Elvin T. Lim. "Five Trends in Presidential Rhetoric: An Analysis of Rhetoric from George Washington to Bill Clinton." *Presidential Studies Quarterly, 32,* 2 (2002).

socio-economic spectrum.[4] For nearly a century and a half after its liberation by Simon Bolivar, most of Venezuela's presidents were military generals. Direct elections were held for the first time in 1958. Venezuela became a democracy and, as such, it appeared to be the exception to the rule in Latin America. In other words, until 1958, Venezuela was thought to have an "exceptional" democracy in part because there appeared to be little conflict between political parties. It was also generally accepted that racism in the country was at very low levels. The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis was founded on the belief that Venezuela's democracy resembled those in stable European countries. However, as Ellner and Tinker Salas point out, Venezuela was not the exceptional, racial democracy that it appeared to be.[5] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there was a growing dissatisfaction with the two dominant parties due in large part to inflation and the government's sometimes violent responses to its people's rebellion. This fueled hunger for a charismatic leader who would understand everyday Venezuelans; it set the stage for Chavez's rise to power.[6]

Hugo Chavez and The Bolivarian Revolution

Chavez has worked hard to build his political identity and his country's mission around Simon Bolivar. He calls his movement the Bolivarian Revolution. Some of the main goals of Chavez's "revolution" are economic and political sovereignty and self-sufficiency for South America, and a participatory democracy, preferably electing Chavez and the Socialist party. He also claims to desire patriotism among Venezuela's citizens, cooperation and unity among Latin American countries, and an end to corruption. Bolivarianism is one and the same as Chavism. *Chavistas* wear red and often paint their faces red, the color Chavez has ascribed to Bolivarianism. Inventing and naming the Bolivarian Revolution is of paramount importance in Chavez's quest for radical reform, not to mention his pursuit of power.

Many authors state that Chavez's followers include only the disadvantaged and the poor.[7] They write that Chavismo's support does not stem from the upper-income groups in Venezuela[8] and that Chavez alienates the

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[4] Kirk Hawkins, "Populism in Venezuela: the rise of Chavismo." *Third World Quarterly,* (2003), 1140.

[5] Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the decline of an "exceptional democracy."* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, Inc., 2007).

[6] Ellner and Tinker Salas.

[7] Ellner and Tinker Salas. *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the decline of an "exceptional democracy."*

[8] Hawkins, 1148.

middle class and professionals.[9] Chavez has even been called the poor people's president in Venezuela.[10] Valencia Ramírez, however, writes that Chavistas are not just the illiterate, but rather they stem from all walks of life.[11]

Chavez aims to unite Venezuela. At times he states his hope of uniting Latin America and the Caribbean as well. However, he is frequently criticized. "Chavez is in essence the reincarnation of the old caudillo. He is populist and salvationist. In this sense he is very different from (Brazil's Luiz Inácio) Lula (da Silva). Lula is not interested in saving the world. …Chavez, in contrast, does have a revolutionary agenda. The problem is that he does not exactly know what it is. It exists only as a slogan called *Bolivarianism,* which means nothing and serves only as a base to throw Venezuela's future out the window."[12] Perhaps the best and most succinct definition of Bolivarianism is Boykoff's: Bolivarianism emphasizes education, a civilian-military union, the integration of Latin America, social justice and national sovereignty.[13]

The Rhetoric of Chavez

Chavez's rhetoric has been described as fiery.[14] He has been called a master communicator and even a showman.[15] Before he was President, Chavez was a popular lecturer at the War College in Caracas. He has been called a spell-binding orator with the "didactic manner of a born teacher"[16] and a mesmerizing speaker.[17] "With an impressive capacity for improvisation – only comparable to that of Fidel Castro – his speeches, his pleas, his insults, his anecdotes and stories…reveal the existence of a narrator of first magnitude."[18]

Exceptionally charismatic when he speaks, Chavez wants his people to see him as another Bolivar, or even as a Christ-like figure. In his speeches he refers time and again to *el pueblo,* or the people. The *pueblo* Hugo Chavez refers

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[9] Hall Gardner, *Averting global war: regional challenges, overextension, and options for American Strategy.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 181.

[10] Bart Jones *Talk of the Nation.* Televised February 18, 2008.

[11] Cristóbal Valencia Ramírez, "Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Who are the Chavistas?" In Ellner and Tinker Salas, 121-139.

[12] Pablo Sotero, "Democracy in Latin America: Alive but Not Well." *Foreign Policy,* (2005), 27.

[13] Boykoff, 6.

[14] Jones, *Talk of the Nation.*

[15] Jorge Carrión, "Deconstructing Chávez." (November 11, 2009), *La vanguardia.*

[16] Eva Golinger, *Bush versus Chavez: Washington's war on Venezuela.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008), 6.

[17] Marylene Smeets, "Radio Chavez: The press and the president in Venezuela." *Quill Magazine,* (2001), 48.

[18] Carrión, translation by the author.

to is the majority of Venezuelans, who live in the marginalized portion of society.[19] Chavez seems to enjoy portraying himself as the underdog. It is, in fact, in his interest for his *pueblo* to view him as one of them.

The Politics of Chavismo

Hawkins states that Chavismo is a populist phenomenon, based on Manichaean discourse, or "people versus the elite."[20] Chavez is quick to paint the U.S. as the 'elite' part of the equation. Chavismo is dedicated to transformation. Chavez came to power in 1998 because Venezuelans wanted change to be brought about by a decisive, patriotic leader. Chavez was seen as strong and clever enough to make the necessary changes.[21]

Although Chavismo has a populist element because it clearly plots the *pueblo* against the *elites,* Zuquete assigns the term 'missionary' to Chavez's politics.[22] Chavez leads his people in a struggle against the all-powerful, corrupt oligarchy, toward redemption[23] and the hope that marginalized Venezuelans will rise up and triumph.

Aló Presidente

Chavez is on television and the radio several hours each week. One author guesses it to be forty hours per week.[24] In the following quote, taken from an episode of *Aló Presidente,* Chavez explains not only his perception of himself, but also how his mission is a continuation of Latin American's past heroes' pursuits.

> "Che Guevara said, very clearly, that in order for a revolutionary process to be successful, it must motivate the people and retain their motivation; without this it would not be a revolution. That is what happened to Bolivar until the year 1814; the Venezuelan people defeated Bolivar in 1814, there is no question about it. The point is that Bolivar had the greatness required to reflect on the defeat, to understand it, and then to go back and unite with the black and olive-skinned Venezuelans, the people of the plains; he won the people's support, their admiration. He removed from himself all vestiges of the oligarch he had been,

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[19] Zuquete, 115.
[20] Hawkins.
[21] Hawkins, 1148.
[22] Zuquete, 99.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] Schoen, 154.

… and joined with the marginalized sectors of society. As the poet said, he ended up with his feet firmly on the ground; he ended up like José Martí, 'sharing my destiny with the poor of my land."[25]

The Discourse of Chavez

Perhaps a large part of Chavez's popularity stems from the fact that he understands the emotional power of television. One can argue that Chavez has perfected what Postman calls the "lesson of all great television commercials: they provide a slogan, a symbol or a focus that creates for viewers a comprehensive and compelling image of themselves."[26] Chavez gives his listeners a mission through the use of frames, language, and metaphors.

Chavez repeatedly incorporates religious features in his speeches, and he intertwines those features in such a way to steer his followers so that they will believe that he is the one to lead them toward a united goal. His mission, as he tells it, is to end the humiliation of the Venezuelan poor by the elites and to create a 'true democracy.'[27] Of extreme importance to this mission, according to Zuquete, is that Chavez's audience believe itself crucial to its success.[28] Chavez claims unwavering loyalty to his country.[29] He speaks of all enemies of Venezuela, or of Chavez, as wicked.[30] Chavez, the Christ figure, is a peasant who symbolizes hope and dignity.[31]

The Venezuelan leader often employs military terminology. He has been called plainspoken, direct, and even "crude," especially when referring to his enemies.[32] He called George W. Bush, his biggest self-perceived enemy, "Mr. Danger, Mr. Devil, coward, assassin," and "alcoholic."[33] Bush has not been the only target. During Holy Week, Chavez called his opponents 'traitors' and compared them to Judas.[34] He has referred to strikers as 'coup plotters.'[35] His own coup, however, was a 'movement' or a 'rebellion.' Those who dare to oppose the Bolivarian Revolution are 'corrupt elites,' and 'filthy.'[36] Chavez is

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[25] Aleida Guevara, *Chavez, Venezuela and the New Latin America: an interview with Hugo Chavez.* (New York: Ocean, 2005), 117-118.

[26] Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death.* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 135.

[27] Zuquete, 98.

[28] Zuquete, 101-2.

[29] Zuquete, 98.

[30] Zuquete, 107.

[31] Zuquete, 107, 109.

[32] Zuquete, 99.

[33] Zuquete, 101.

[34] Hawkins, 1154.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Hawkins, 1153.

quoted as saying, "For a movement to be revolutionary, it has to be transform-ative, it has to take a swing at the powerful."[37] He often uses the *nosotros* or 'we' voice, even when he is referring only to himself.[38] Others become *los escuálidos,* 'the squalid' or 'the opposition.'[39]

Moreno explains that Chavez repeatedly uses several metaphors. One of those is that Chavez is the nation of Venezuela, resurrected and ready to fight. The Revolution is Chavez's war, and the opposition is made up of criminals.[40] It is extremely important for Chavez to be seen as one of the people, part of *el pueblo*,[41] as his discourse counts on the people perceiving themselves as participants in a struggle against the elite.[42]

Chavez In The News

If it is true that Chavez is not interested in solving Venezuela's problems, but in creating problems for the U.S.,[43] he was handed an excellent opportunity when George W. Bush became president. Post 9/11, when President Bush declared that countries could "either be with us or against us," Chavez dared not to obey the ultimatum.[44] Another daring move by Chavez came shortly after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld compared Chavez to Hitler. Chavez's retort was that Hitler "would be like a suckling baby next to George W. Bush."[45] Ellner and Tinker Salas claim that, "By demonizing Chavez, the Bush administration and much of the media … reached easy answers that belie the complexity of his presidency."[46] Jones also declares that the U.S. media is one-sided when it comes to Chavez.[47]

It is not a well-known fact among U.S. citizens that Chavez has redirected some of Venezuela's oil revenue to the poor. For example, in the "doctors for oil" deal, Cuban doctors were available in poor neighborhoods in

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[37] Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka. *Hugo Chavez.* (New York: Random House, 2007), 23.

[38] Carrión.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] Marco Aponte Moreno. "Metaphors in Hugo Chavez's political discourse: Conceptualizing Nation, Revolution and Opposition." Ph.D. dissertation, (The City University of New York, 2008).

[41] Carrión; Zuquete

[42] Hawkins, 1153.

[43] Schoen.

[44] Golinger, 15

[45] Robert DeBeaugrande, "The Discourse and Counter-Discourse of Hugo Chavez." *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines, 2,* (2008), 21.

[46] Ellner and Tinker Salas. xvi.

[47] Jones

Venezuela twenty-four hours a day.[48] Additionally, Venezuela donated a million dollars in oil and supplies to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The donations had to be channeled through U.S.-based and Venezuelan-owned Citgo Petroleum Corporation.[49] During that same year the Venezuelan government also began a program to provide heating oil at a discounted cost to U.S. residents. Recipients included low-income and homeless shelters in the Northeast. The Bush administration's response was to complain that Chavez was trying to purchase political support in the U.S.[50]

Chavez has appeared in the headlines in 2011 and 2012 for two main reasons: his battle against cancer and the presidential election against rival Henrique Capriles Radonski.[51] Current speculation is that his surgery in 2011 took place in Cuba because privacy is likely to be maintained at the hospital where both Fidel and Raul Castro have undergone procedures.[52] The cancer is officially a "pelvic abscess."[53] Most guesses are that it is either prostate or colon cancer. The first operation in June of 2011 was carried out by a Cuban doctor but a well-known Spanish surgeon had to operate a second time days later.[54] Chavez has been sure not to lend his critics support as they compare him to the younger and physically fit Capriles. Perhaps in answer to their doubts about his health and stamina, he danced on the balcony after another surgery in March of 2012.[55]

Chavez in 2009

It can be argued that Chavez has flaunted his power even more openly since a referendum was passed to end term limits in Venezuela. The night of February 15, 2009, when Chavez learned the referendum had passed, he lashed out at Antonio Ledezma, the mayor of Caracas who had spoken out against Chavez's attempt to take authority from elected state and local officials. Three

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[48] Schoen, 154; Jones.

[49] Golinger, 151

[50] Golinger, 151-2.

[51] "Hugo Chavez Cancer Surgery: Election Campaign Uncertain," *Huffington Post,* February 22, 2012.

[52] Fernando Ravsberg. "¿Por qué Chávez se opera en Cuba?" *BBC Mundo,* February 28, 2012.

[53] Mauricio Vincent, "Hugo Chávez, operado de urgencia en Cuba." *El país,* June 12, 2011.

[54] "Cáncer ha perforado intestino de Chávez: médico español lo operó." *Pachamama.* July 2, 2011. (http://www.pachamamaradio.org/02-07-2011/cancer-ha-perforado-intestino-de-cavezme ico- spanol-lo-opero.html)

[55] Wallis, Daniel. "Venezuela's Chavez sings and dances after surgery." *Reuters,* March 18, 2012. (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/03/18/venezuela-chavez-idINDEE82H00S20120 318).

months later, Chavez was in the news again after he met Obama for the first time at the Fifth Summit of the Americas. Chavez gave Obama a gift: the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Eduardo Galeano's *The Open Veins of Latin America,* about imperialism in Latin America.

Chavez was in the news three times in August of 2009. In the first case, when plans were revealed for the U.S. military to use a base in Colombia to fight drug trafficking and terrorism, Chavez stated, "The Yankees have started to command Colombian military forces."[56] Even after Colombian President Alvaro Uribe stated that a U.S. presence in Colombia would not threaten South American nations, Chavez called it a "provocation" and stationed Venezuelan troops on the border of Colombia in what would be the beginning of an on-going dispute.

Six days later there was a coup against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya and Chavez landed in the headlines again. In response to President Obama's reaction to the coup, Chavez said, "We are not asking you to intervene in Honduras, Obama. On the contrary, we are asking that 'the empire' get its hands off Honduras and get its claws out of Latin America."[57]

How a man dares to direct such comments publicly and to the most powerful man on earth is a mystery to many. The fact that the same man has been elected president of one of the largest oil-producing countries in the world may seem outlandish. Chavez's popularity and his rise to power began in 1992 when he gave his most famous speech and, consequently, became a hero to many Venezuelans. That speech will forever be known as his *Por ahora,* or *For Now*, speech.

Por Ahora

A bad economy, high inflation, and political unrest led to a military coup in which Chavez was instrumental. Although the coup failed, Chavez's fame was ignited when he was allowed to speak on television. His duty on the air was to notify other coup leaders to surrender. As Carrión notes, Chavez would turn a coup gone bad into the "best publicity spot of the decade."[58] The minute-long speech he gave in the early morning hours of February 4, 1992 unarguably became the most famous of all of Chavez's speeches, resulting in fame and wide-spread support.

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[56] "Alarm at US-Colombia troops plan," *BBC News,* August 10, 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/Americas/8194497.stm)

[57] Patricia Rondon and Frank Jack Daniel, "Chavez says Obama 'lost in space' on Latin America." *Reuters,* August 16, 2009.

[58] Carrión.

My companions, unfortunately, *for now,* our proposed objectives have not been achieved… Now it is time to reflect. New situations will arise. Without a doubt, the country must point itself toward a better destiny. … Listen to Major Chavez who is sending this message out to you. … I assume the responsibility for this Bolivarian military movement. (translation and emphasis by the author)

These days Chavez simply has to say the words *for now* and the country knows he is referring to the *Por ahora* speech and to the fact that he believes a better future is in the making.

Three of Chavez's Key Speeches

Zuquete noted that Chavez is seen as a 'second Bolivar' and he commented about the "sacralization of politics embedded in Chavez's discourse."[59] It is pertinent now to expand on Zuquete's analysis of the victory speech given when Chavez won his third presidential election and to compare this speech with two others: a speech from late 2007 when Chavez suffered defeat, and a victory speech from 2009 that could define Chavez at his most triumphant.

December 3, 2006

Zuquete's analysis of the victory speech given by Chavez in 2006 includes commentary about tone, symbols, terminology, and Chavez's perception of himself and his mission. Religious features are intertwined throughout the speech. For example, Chavez often compares the mission of the people of Venezuela to the work of Christ.[60] Chavez sees himself as a messianic leader who fights for justice and defends the oppressed.[61] As has been pointed out on numerous occasions, he paints himself as a common person. In his victory speech of 2006, he explained that his mission was to create a true democracy and to bring about Bolivarian socialism which, in his definition, is the antithesis of capitalism. He seeks to end his people's ongoing humiliation, thereby saving Venezuela and witnessing her rebirth.[62] Chavez often uses the words *for now*. He trusts that the words will rekindle the hope instilled in Venezuelans in 1992, that Chavez himself would lead them to the promise of freedom and justice, or

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[59] Zuquete, 121.
[60] Zuquete, 107.
[61] Zuquete, 109.
[62] Zuquete, 98.

Bolivarianism. Zuquete rightly states that there is an apocalyptic tone[63] in Chavez's speeches, and that Chavez has developed a 'discourse of identity' that makes the people feel they are part of his mission.[64]

In his victory speech in 2006 Chavez told listeners in Latin America and the Caribbean to unite and "Join us!" He hoped to explain his concept of Bolivarianism and socialism: we are not Russia and we are not communist. He hoped to send the message that Chavez and Bolivarianism are positive, "[From this balcony I send you] this hug … for all of our heroic people…" He again took the stance of "us" (the common people, the peasants, *el pueblo*) against "them" (the corrupt elites, oligarchs, and bureaucrats).

Chavez "aims to bring forth a true democracy" to Venezuela.[65] Ironically, one rhyming slogan he used in his victory speech in 2006 was commonly used in Chile in 1973, as Allende's star was falling and Pinochet's was on the rise. *¡El pueblo unido jamás será vencido!* (The people united will never be defeated!) He also spoke of "The Kingdom of the future Venezuela" as if he were speaking of The Kingdom of Christ.[66]

Another metaphor included calling Simon Bolivar the Quixote of Caracas. Near the end of the speech he referred to Venezuela as a white horse. "I invite all of you to continue marching toward victory like the white horse that gallops free on the shield of the Fatherland." He pointed out his high hopes for the future of his country, and perhaps for himself, with one final metaphor:

> And I don't do it without … asking God … our Father and asking the same from myself, capacity, wisdom, courage to continue steering the new Venezuelan ship according to your command. To continue driving the ship that is now traveling on the open sea with its sails fully extended, at full speed. We are heading for the future. We are going to turn Venezuela into a Latin American power, a true moral power, a true popular power, a true economic power, a cultural power, a wise, collective power … a power [that can] unite the people of Latin America and the Caribbean. And give shape to the new world, to the new society, that [new world] being the twenty-first century that is not yet ours, it is the century of our children, of our grandchildren. [It is] to our children, to our

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[63] Zuquete, 113.
[64] Zuquete, 101-102.
[65] Zuquete, 114.
[66] Zuquete, 113.

grandchildren that we dedicate this victory.   (translation by the author)

The Word *New*

Chavez articulated the word 'new' forty-two times in this speech. If the apparent reasons for the recurrence of this word are analyzed, it seems that his objectives for using it differed for listeners inside Venezuela and those on the outside. He used the word 'new' to excite and to incite the listeners within the country. "It is the victory of love, the victory of the new." He hoped to unify Venezuelans -- he spoke of the "new Fatherland" -- and to unite Venezuela with other Latin American countries, "...to unite the people of Latin America and the Caribbean, and to give a new shape to the new world, to the new society, to the new century…" He hoped to unify them against "Mr. Danger," again reinforcing political polarization[67] and uniting Venezuelans through a common enemy. "Down with imperialism! We need a new world…" He aimed to inspire Venezuelans and to help them feel positively about themselves, their country, and their leader, "the hope of a good Fatherland, a new Fatherland." Chavez wanted to define socialism "…new era is the socialist economy … a Venezuela where equality and freedom reign," as well as to define his goals as positive and inclusive, while at the same time building a distrust of others. As Aponte Moreno explained, although Chavez's rhetoric is officially inclusive, it is really a discourse of exclusion.[68]

When Chavez used the word "new" in 2006, he hoped that listeners outside of Venezuela would see his country as a beacon and view it with respect, "Venezuela is demonstrating that a new, better world is possible, and we are building it." He wanted to unite Latin America. "From here we send out our call to the four winds of the continent, our call to the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America … the new integration that Simon Bolivar, Antonio Nariño, Antonio José de Sucre, Manuela Sáenz, José de San Martín, Bernardo O'Higgins, José Gervasio Artigas, Augusto César Sandino, Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Morazán, José Ignacio Abreu e Lima[69] dreamed of;

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[67] María Alejandra Muñoz Navarro, "Caracterización del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías como 'persona retórica' a través del examen de uso que él hace de un cierto número de 'figuras de la retórica', o 'estructuras retóricas' insertas en actos de habla, que contribuyen con la creación de la misma." Ph.D. dissertation, (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2007).

[68] Aponte Moreno, 2008.

[69] In addition to Bolivar, Chavez has mentioned a Colombian, a Venezuelan, the Ecuadoran mistress of Bolivar, an Argentine, a Chilean, a Uruguayan, a Nicaraguan, two Mexicans, a Honduran, and a Portuguese man who helped Bolivar to free Venezuela and Colombia.

every one of them gave their lives for the unity of our people. Let's unite and we will be free." He pointed out that Venezuela would be the future, "the new Fatherland… That is to say, the reign of socialism...is the reign of the Venezuelan future."

December 3, 2007

Exactly one year after his victory speech, Chavez suffered defeat. His side lost a vote that could have abolished term limits. A melancholic Chavez gave a much shorter speech than usual. Although it shared a few of the characteristics common in speeches by Chavez, it lacked many others.

Common Elements

As usual, Chavez spoke of Bolivar. He referred to himself as a soldier, saying "we were made for battles." He employed the usual anti-U.S. rhetoric, saying about Venezuelans, "Oh I hope we will learn to respect each other and to move away from the Empire!" He reminded his listeners of the mission. "We know what the future will be! Equality should be the fundamental principle!" Chavez even incorporated rhyme as he made the sound of a "red" rooster, the symbol of the Venezuelan communist party, complaining that some votes went to the communist cause. "I heard, 'cock-a-doodle-doo! This one is for you!'" Chavez reminded his listeners of his *Por ahora* speech, crying "For me this is not a defeat! This is another *For now!"*

Differences

Unlike the two victory speeches analyzed in this paper, when Chavez suffered defeat, he told his followers to be patient, all the while trying to incite listeners to question whether the election had been fair. He criticized the fact that the election had been called before the last vote was counted, while the difference between Yes and No votes was still just 1.4%, a "microscopic" difference.

Chavez's insinuations were abundant in this speech. "The missing [votes were done] manually." In other words, human error is possible. "Mistakes [made by] machines." Do we trust machines? They took place in "far away places." The insinuation here, of course, is that all kinds of things could happen and we would not know! Chavez stated that he would prefer that the defeat had been clearer. *¡Decisión muy chiquitica!* "A teeny tiny [difference]!" He even stated that he almost demanded a recount but decided to let the process play itself out, insinuating that he is not like U.S. politicians Bush or Gore. Chavez labeled his opponents' victory "pyrrhic." He told his followers not to rebel, while pointing

out to his critics that Democracy was alive and well in Venezuela. "Civil War? No! … We will confront the process! There is no dictatorship here!"

Chavez criticized those who were not in favor of a new Constitution in 1998 but who used the constitution adopted that year to incite people to vote No. The word "new" only crossed his lips once in this speech, compared with forty-two times in his victory speech just one year earlier. This time, when he mentioned Bolivar, he took the opportunity to break away from the leader whose pursuit he often claims as his own, stating that Bolivar said, "If the majority does not accept it, I will pass it along" for posterity to decide, but then Chavez added, "Not to the posterity of a hundred years from now! No!" So Chavez's patience was beginning to run thin. The final words of the speech were words of hope. "We will be victorious!"

February 15, 2009

Just over a year later, Chavez was indeed victorious. He and his followers won the vote to end term limits, giving Chavez the possibility to be President for life. The victory speech Chavez gave that night had much in common with the victory speech from December of 2006 but it included some new facets as well.

Chavez still referred to himself as a soldier and as the people's servant. He mentioned Simon Bolivar and Bolivarianism twenty-two times. He again spoke of Venezuela as if it had awakened from a long slumber[70] or had been brought back to life. Chavez still saw himself as *el pueblo* and as *the future* and his messianic identity or mission[71] continued to be front and center. He used the word "red" many times, and spoke of Latin America. The organization of the two speeches is nearly identical.

Chavez's Missionary Politics

By the time Chavez gave his victory speech in 2009 he had come to the realization that God wanted his kind of socialism.

> "Socialism, the reign of God on earth, the reign of peace, of justice and of equality, what Christ came to announce more than two thousand years ago: socialism, a society where we can all live as brothers, as equals. A society, therefore, of social justice and peace, of happiness."

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[70] Aponte Moreno, 2008.
[71] Zuquete, 109.

He spoke of the future of Venezuela as an international power, and likened Venezuela's (his) win to the story of Lazarus, someone touched by Christ. "The Venezuelan people are like a great, collective Lazarus rising from among the dead."

I, Chavez

Chavez used the word "I" decidedly more than was necessary in the speech in 2009. Because Spanish is a 'pro-drop' language, when there is a conjugated verb, the subject pronoun is often left out or dropped because it is unnecessary and redundant. Such is the case in the following excerpt in which the translation includes the extra subject pronoun even though it would not usually appear in a translation.

> "Look, I (I) am going to say the following, I want to tell you this from my heart, I told you that I would be here waiting for you. But I (I) told you, I remember I told you that today, the fifteenth, I (I) would be waiting for you..."

Even without the extra emphasis, the reader can discern that Chavez seemed to feel at liberty to be the subject of the win. In past speeches, Chavez was the *pueblo*. On the day of this victory, Chavez himself emerges victorious.

The Word *New*

Chavez employed the word "new" twenty-three times in the speech in 2009, many fewer than the forty-two times than he used it in 2006. In 2009, the word "new" was used to tell listeners in Venezuela about their exciting future, "We have opened big doors to new horizons," that Venezuela would become a world power, and that Simon Bolivar would be happy. "Here we are, Father Bolivar, two hundred years later, showing the old world the majesty of the new man, the majesty of [a] new society, the majesty of the new man and of the new Fatherland." Chavez used the word "new" once again to unify the Venezuelan people, now stronger and moving forward together. "Venezuela has won a long battle," "we have built [it] together," "we have arrived."

The listener outside of Venezuela might have heard the word "new" in different ways. For example, Chavez wanted the world to know that Venezuela would advance while he was in charge. He spoke of "the history of a new people." He announced that he would be in power for at least another decade, "We are going full throttle these four years, toward 2012, and toward 2019." He announced that a new, stronger Venezuela was emerging with Chavez at the helm when he spoke of "advancing toward new achievements." Venezuela spoke

of "our new Fatherland" to give the idea of a united Venezuela. He claimed that the country had been revived and was united; in order to do this he said that the advent of Social democracy was "heroic" and "today it has received a new injection of patriotic fire."

While the key word in his speech in 2006 was 'new,' an important word in the speech in 2009 was 'dignity.' In his victory speech of 2006 he used it once "we have given another lesson in dignity to North American imperialism." In 2009 he used it seven times. He spoke of "flags of dignity … dignity of the Fatherland …" and claimed that "the people's dignity has won … I hope everybody will recognize the dignity of the Bolivarian people's win … the path [toward the future is the] path of the dignity of man, the dignity of woman, the dignity of the people." He even stated that Venezuela would "not return to its past of indignity."

One must presume that Chavez's interest in dignity in 2009 is three-fold, encompassing Venezuela's history, global politics in recent years, and Chavez himself. Historically, of course, the dignity of the Venezuelan people was trampled on by the Spaniards. Currently, on a global scale, Venezuela is neither viewed with nor treated with the respect and dignity Chavez feels is owed a country with such vast oil resources. In terms of Chavez's personal dignity, he is the consummate underdog. The leader of an oil-rich country, continually disrespected by his self-appointed nemesis from 2001-2008, Chavez was disgraced by his own people in 2007 when they failed to give him the chance to be their eternal leader. When Chavez gave this speech on February 15, 2009, he had recaptured his own dignity, after losing it just over one year earlier.

A New Trinity of Heroes

With his dignity restored, Chavez seemed to find new freedom. He broke away from the Trinity of heroes[72] commonly mentioned in previous speeches. The usual trinity included three historical Venezuelan figures: Simon Bolivar; Simon Rodriguez, a mentor and close friend of Bolivar; and Ezequiel Zamora, a peasant leader. However, the Trinity of heroes seemed to have undergone a metamorphosis by the time Chavez gave his victory speech in 2009. The new Trinity included Bolivar, Fidel Castro, and Chavez himself. This new Trinity places Castro squarely in the position of the Son, or Christ.

It goes without question that Bolivar must remain in the Trinity of heroes. He has always been of extreme importance in Chavez's message and mission. Chavez has continually alluded to Bolivar (the Spirit in the new Trinity) as the original dreamer, creator of the cause for which Chavez continues to fight.

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[72] Zuquete, 108.

The second of the new Trinity of Heroes, Fidel Castro is named no fewer than eight times in this speech (but only twice in each of the other two speeches analyzed earlier). Chavez and Castro have been compared many times but they have seldom been contrasted. Although Chavez has been friendly to Castro in the past, on the evening of this victory, Chavez openly and repeatedly expresses his admiration for the Cuban leader. He no longer fears being linked with Fidel, the Father of the new Trinity.

Finally, it can be argued that, in his victory speech in 2009, Chavez includes himself in the new Trinity of heroes. The termination of his presidency is no longer imminent; he can be President for life. He, like his dear country, has been reborn, his dignity restored. The Son has risen!

The New Chavez

Chavez mentioned and quoted a wide assortment of people in his victory speech of 2009. In addition to Bolivar, Fidel and the Bible, Chavez also quoted Unamuno, Borges, and Brecht, a decidedly more international group than usual. Why would he branch out in this way? Perhaps his objective was to expand his political horizon outside of Venezuela. Although this remains a possibility, the text of the victory speech seems to disprove this possibility. That said, three years earlier Chavez asked the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean to join Venezuela. Was his goal to seem more educated? To gain more, and more varied, supporters? It can indeed be argued that Chavez was attempting to gain the support of educated Venezuelans. He may not need their support now that there are no longer term limits, but if he is indeed a messianic leader, he must continue to have many followers.

References have been made earlier in this paper about the number of times Chavez utters specific words in each of the three speeches. Of the key words that he uses fairly consistently, *Bolivar* and *Bolivarianism* rise to the top of the list because they play a large role in all of Chavez's speeches. The number of uses is fairly constant when it is figured as a percentage of the total number of words in each speech. The word *will,* indicating the future tense, which in Spanish is actually a suffix, also remains fairly constant throughout the speeches (see Table 1).

Table 1. Words Used Fairly Constantly By Chavez In The Three Speeches

	Victory speech of 2006 (% of words in speech)	Speech of defeat, 2007 (% of words in speech)	Victory speech of 2009 (% of words in speech)
Bolívar/Bolivarian	**20** (0.6%)	**8** (0.4%)	**22** (0.44%)
-emos (we will… to indicate future)	**6** (0.19%)	**3** (0.16%)	**8** (0.16%)

The occurrence of some other words depended on whether Chavez was suffering defeat or celebrating victory. It is interesting to note that, although Chavez uses the future tense quite consistently in all of his speeches (Table 1), he uses the word *future* much more often when he is victorious. Chavez also seems more likely to view himself as a fighter in the face of victory. Table 2 shows the words that vary according to the tenor of the event.

Table 2. Words Whose Frequency Of Use Varies According To Victory Or Defeat

	Victory speech of 2006 (% of words in speech)	Speech of defeat, 2007 (% of words in speech)	Victory speech of 2009 (% of words in speech)
nuev- (new)	**42** (1.3%)	**1** (.05%)	**23** (.45%)
amor (love)	**10** (0.3%)	**0**	**6** (0.1%)
victor(ious)	**56** (1.7%)	**7** (0.4%)	**57** (1.1%)
futuro	**5** (0.15%)	**1** (0.05%)	**13** (0.26%)
batalla, lucha (battle, fight)	**8** (0.25%)	**2** (0.11%)	**17** (0.38%)

The next three categories show the change in Chavez's speeches over time and, one could argue, the change in Chavez himself. We have already seen some of the "rare words" that seem to be new themes for Chavez in 2009 (Table 3).[73] The words in this category are words often linked to religious figures and royalty. In 2009 Chavez seems to have felt less a member of the *pueblo* and more Christ-like.

Table 3. Rare words, used more commonly in one speech than in the others

	Victory speech of 2006 (% of words in speech)	Speech of defeat, 2007 (% of words in speech)	Victory speech of 2009 (% of words in speech)
majestad (majesty)	**0**	**0**	**4** (0.08%)
dignidad (dignity)	**1** (0.03%)	**0**	**7** (0.14%)

The words that Chavez utters less over time include *liberty/freedom* and *equality* (see Table 4). The decrease in usage of the word *equality* could in fact show that Chavez is following Napoleon's example. That is one idea to explore in a future paper.

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[73] Chavez's use of the words 'majesty' and 'dignity' are discussed in the section about the February, 2009 speech under the subheading about the word 'new.'

Table 4. Words used less frequently over time

	Victory speech of 2006 (% of words in speech)	Speech of defeat, 2007 (% of words in speech)	Victory speech of 2009 (% of words in speech)
libertad (freedom, liberty)	**4** (0.1%)	**4** (0.2%)	**1** (0.02%)
igualdad (equality)	**4** (1.2%)	**1** (0.05%)	**1** (0.02%)

Chavez utters certain words with more and more frequency (see Table 5). Over time his focus seems to have shifted from equality and freedom to power and himself. He also gives increased significance to Fidel the Father.

Table 5. Words used more frequently over time

	Victory speech of 2006 (% of words in speech)	Speech of defeat, 2007 (% of words in speech)	Victory speech of 2009 (% of words in speech)
poder, poderoso (power, powerful)	**1** (0.03%)	**2** (0.10%)	**8** (0.16%)
Fidel / Castro	**2** (0.06%)	**2** (0.1%)	**8** (0.16%)
yo (I)	**7** (0.2%)	**9** (0.5%)	**37** (0.7%)

Chavez and Presidents of the United States

Many of the these trends in Chavez's rhetoric can be likened to presidential rhetoric in the United States since Theodore Roosevelt.[74] The trends Lim points out about the rhetoric of modern U.S. presidents indicate that Chavez may only be emanating what he has seen and heard from presidents in the U.S. For example, in their inaugural addresses and the annual (State of the Union) addresses, modern presidents in the U.S., from Theodore Roosevelt through Bill Clinton, have increased the number of references they make to themselves;[75] have used an increasingly conversational, intimate, and chatty tone;[76] are more colloquial;[77] and their rhetoric is anti-intellectual.[78] Lim even quotes President Nixon saying to his speechwriters, "Never give me a naked quote. Put it in a little story,"[79] which is an idea Chavez's seems to live by. Lim's analysis about the trends in modern U.S. presidential rhetoric together with the trends in Chavez's indicate that there is a clear similarity between Hugo Chavez's rhetoric and that of modern presidents in the U.S. What do Chavez's speeches say about the state of democracy in Venezuela? If his rhetoric is an indication, it is possible that

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[74] Lim, 329.
[75] Lim, 343.
[76] Lim, 338, 343.
[77] Lim, 334.
[78] Lim, 333.
[79] Lim, 344.

Venezuela's democracy may not be very different from the democracy found in the United States.

Conclusion

The changes in Chavez's speeches are a reflection of changes observed in speeches given by leaders in our own democracy. As Lim noted, "Presidential rhetoric in the past thirty years has become dramatically more people-oriented and compassionate, more intimate, more focused on the trustworthiness of the rhetor, and more anecdotal."[80] The three of Chavez's speeches examined here show that President Chavez's rhetoric has evolved in many of those same ways. They also show how he inspires, motivates, and unites large groups of people.

The new Hugo Chavez, emboldened by his victory in February, 2009 seems to view himself as a savior instead of as one of the *pueblo.* This messianic leader is buoyed by his recovered dignity. Perhaps as a result, he seems increasingly willing to goad others with the sole intention of demonstrating his power.

This shift in the way Chavez views himself seems evident in the three speeches examined here. He has shifted from (first) a missionary, messianic leader who is, himself, one of the common people, to (second) a downtrodden soul, forsaken by his people, to (third) an indestructible, reborn leader. The clues in three recent speeches suggest that Chavez may indeed view himself as a Christ-like figure who led his people, was forsaken by them, and who finally feels indestructible.

No matter what other international leaders think or say about Hugo Chavez, he has taken pride in using his oratory to exercise influence in Venezuela and the larger region. He has also greatly enjoyed himself while doing so. In a world that is growing ever smaller, it can prove useful to learn how a common man can use his charisma, rhetoric, and intuition to seize power and retain it. Discourse is always linked to power.[81]

Future research could continue the same heuristic and stylometric approach, taking into account speeches Chavez will give after key elections and events. It could integrate speeches by other leaders in Venezuela and Latin America. Another interesting direction would be to include information about Venezuela's citizens, their lives, and the reasons behind their voting decisions.[82]

The three speeches examined in this paper are key speeches given by Chavez at emotional times. As the publication date of this article draws near,

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[80] Lim, 345.
[81] Pennycook,115-138.
[82] Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this last idea.

Chavez is yet again running for re-election in Venezuela. After a recent surgery related to his cancer, Chavez recently declared himself, "More Christian than ever." Time will tell whether this leader's health-- and power -- can live on.

Notes

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CORRUPTION AND REVOLUTION:
TRANSFORMATIONS OF CRIME
INTO POLITICAL CAPITAL IN THE PHILIPPINES

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According to Max Weber (1965), manufactured pseudocharisma is a creation of the state. It serves to maintain the status quo and prevent the formation of genuine revolutions among the people. This article shows how Philippine ideological state apparatuses (government, media, and the criminal justice system) constructed the pseudo charismatic leader President Joseph Estrada and provided Estrada ways to transform his crimes into political capital. Through the processes of arrest, prosecution, and conviction, Estrada's crimes came to symbolize the experiences of the urban poor and their marginalized status; enacting support for Estrada as president through a popular people power revolt, the poor spoke out against the criminal justice system and poverty without challenging political structures. They spoke of support for Estrada the "criminal" as a strategy to negotiate security of housing. Interviews with Estrada's supporters and focus group discussions reveal urban poor supporters of Estrada were rational, critical, politically active and decisive individuals who nevertheless symbolized their hopes for security in the prosecution of a corrupt politician. This finding challenges Philippine pundits' descriptions of Estrada's supporters as "lumpen, idiot, unemployed, rented, irrational, emotional and agitated individuals who had been fooled, brainwashed and hoodwinked by Estrada and his cohorts" (Magno 2004). The success of Estrada as a criminal politician validates the critical criminological concept of the criminal justice system as an apparatus of the "capitalist state" (Anthony Amatrudo 2009:7) that pacifies revolutionary uprisings of the people by rephrasing, disguising, and diffusing sources and products of social tension.

Introduction

Plunder was the main issue behind the ouster, arrest and prosecution of Philippine President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. He was forced to resign from office through EDSA II, a popular revolution led by middle-class Filipinos from January 17 to January 20, 2001. On April 2001, an army battalion arrested Estrada. One month after Estrada's arrest and imprisonment, three million Filipinos, mostly from urban poor communities, stormed the Malacañang (the Philippine Presidential Palace) in an effort to return Estrada to power in a third popular revolt that became known as EDSA III. During Estrada's prosecution and incarceration between 2001 and 2007 and in the midst of public debate over his criminality, most politicians whom he endorsed from jail won in the 2001,

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2004 and 2007 national elections, those elected included Estrada's wife, Senator Luisa Estrada (2001), and his son, Senator Jinggoy Estrada (2001 and 2010).

President Estrada was found guilty of plunder on September 17, 2007. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, formerly Estrada's vice-president, pardoned him on October 25, 2007, and Estrada was released from jail. Estrada ran for president in the 2010 Philippine national election and placed second among ten candidates.[1] In a June 2009 Social Weather Station (SWS) Presidentiables Survey, he had placed first among presidential candidates.

This exploration of crime as political capital raises several questions as it explores how Estrada's crimes and convictions became political capital and contributed to the former president's continued and considerable political influence and power, exercised primarily through endorsements and Estrada's own candidacy in Philippine national political elections. Who are the supporters of Estrada? What are their perceptions of his crimes and prosecution? Why did Estrada's supporters remain loyal to him despite his crimes? What is the urban poor notion and understanding of corruption generally? Why did the urban poor support Estrada even though they knew that he was corrupt? How did his arrest and display of his mug-shot photo on television and in newspapers ignite protest among millions of lower-class Filipinos?

The Public Criminal and Populist Leadership in the State

Criminals participate in politics not only in the Philippines but also in other countries. In India, candidates in the 2005 Assembly election included alleged criminal elements such as "murderers, racketeers, kidnappers, corruptors and drug syndicates" (Manas 2002: 1). Gujarat Election Watch (2002) reported that in the assembly election of 2002, of the candidates contesting 182 seats, 140 had a criminal record.

In Bangladesh, Taj Hashmi (2006) has blamed slow growth and elusive prosperity on criminal politicians. Most of the criminal politicians, according to Hasmi (2006), are connected both to underworld elements and businessmen. In 2007, **Governor Fakhruddin Ahmed of the Central Bank of Bangladesh, in his war against "**corruptionists and criminal godfathers," named **41 top politicians and businessmen as the most wanted criminals in Bangladesh** (*Bangladesh News* 2007)**.**

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2004) characterizes the criminalization of politics as the active involvement and participation of "alleged murderers, racketeers, and kidnappers" and other criminal elements in political

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[1] Estrada received 21 percent, followed by Sen. Manuel Villar, who received 19 percent (Zamora and Escandor 2009).

races. Several populist theorists (Panizza 2005, Laclau 2005 and Roberts 2000) offer examples of criminal politicians as populist leaders (Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia, Yasser Arafat of Palestine, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa). Through their theories, one can identify different social situations in which a populist criminal politician might arise. Laclau (2005: 9) argues that the condition leading to "populist rapture" arises when a plurality of demands coexists with an institutional system that is increasingly capable of absorbing them. In this circumstance, a populist identity emerges out of the separation of specific identities – workers, vendors, peasants, the unemployed, women, and ethnic groups – from the needs of those making demands.

In Latin America, populist politics has ascended in periods of rapid economic change and political crisis (Roberts 2000). Roberts (*Ibid*.: 9) explains that two periods in Latin American history – the economic depression of the 1930s to 1950 and the structural adjustments and neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s – resulted in the disintegration and realignment of political parties and in the transformation of governmental administrations. During the first period from the 1930s to 1950, mass politics replaced oligarchic political domination. The political disconnections of these two periods freed a significant sector of the lower classes for political mobilization as established political institutions pushed them into the margins. As a result of political change and marginalization, the lower classes became more inclined to create populist leaders.

The Great Depression, as Roberts (2000: 9) explains, *"sounded the death-knell for the commodity-export model of development"* in the Latin American region and led to policies favoring state-led industrialization in the larger and wealthier countries of Latin America. As the middle and working classes expanded with urbanization and industrialization, traditional elite-led parties were incapable of incorporating them and articulating their interests (Roberts 2000).

At the same time, according to Roberts (*Ibid.*), these growing sectors of society lost their ties to traditional forms of political patronage. At work and in public life, they were marginalized by "representative institutions." Roberts (*Ibid*.: 10) concludes that populist leaders emerged in such situations – when the party system is weak and non-inclusive, labor organizations are not fully organized, and civil society cannot encompass expanding urban and rural masses. He labeled populist leaders who arose in these contexts *state corporatist* leaders and included among them such figures as Juan Perón of Argentina (1946-1955), Lazaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) of Mexico, Getulio Vargas of Brazil (1930-1954), and Haya de la Torre in Peru (1978-1979). These state corporatist populist figures mobilized the masses from the top-down and challenged the oligarchic order with promises of political inclusion and economic well-being for the

working and lower classes. These leaders expanded the state's economic role by protecting and subsidizing basic industries, creating protectionist economic policies, providing oversight of labor markets, and expanding social benefits.

Roberts (*Ibid.*) explains that a second wave of populism in Latin America appeared in the 1980s to 1990s in response to the erosion of the social, economic, and political structure that state corporatist leaders had built. Inflation and debt crises challenged nationalist development policies. These policies were replaced by the entrance of global markets, neo-liberal reforms, and weakened labor movements. Many people experienced severe political repression under military dictatorships. Workers poured from declining unions into the informal and temporary contract labor sectors. The people, experiencing increased inequality and marginalization through policies of visibly corrupt leaders, became further detached from political parties and democratic institutions (Roberts 2000). Under these conditions, a new type of populist leader emerged, which Roberts (2000) categorizes as the *liberal pluralist*. These are leaders such as Fernando Alfonso Collor de Mello of Brazil (1990-1992), Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori (1990-2000) of Peru, and Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1999-present) of Venezuela. Liberal pluralists locate power in multi-class coalitions that they nourish with populist and anti-establishment rhetoric. They create alliances with the elite through free market reforms (*Ibid.*).

How Do Populist Criminal Politicians Build Their Relationship To The People?

Populist criminal politicians build their relationships to the people through the publicity accorded their crimes. In India, criminal politicians create little secrecy around their crimes; instead, they seek publicity for the political causes attached to their crimes. Schafer (1971:386) argues that "dramatic publicity is almost a necessity" for political criminals who want to make the public aware of their political goals. Political criminals appeal to the public through publicity that represents their criminal behavior as necessary to bringing change to existing systems of society. In publicizing their crimes they directly challenge the legitimacy of state laws.

Similarly, the experience of the Philippines suggests that a politician can use his or her criminality effectively in symbolizing a populist challenge to the legitimacy of state institutions and leaders. There, the criminal identity has helped insiders within state political processes and institutions, even members of the oligarchy or successful politicians such as Estrada, position themselves as outsiders and link effectively to large numbers of marginalized voters. Panizza (2005) has observed a similar populist dynamic in Latin America where, he argues, there can be no populist leadership without a successful constitution of

new identities and a successful linking of new political identities with members of the public who have never been represented in governmental apparatuses because of their class, religion, ethnicity, gender and/or geographical location. Classical populist figures like Perón, Cárdenas, Vargas and Haya de la Torre directly organized their mass supporters into workers' parties and labor and peasant organizations (Connif 1999). In contrast, contemporary Latin American populist figures like Collor, Chavez and Fujimori have not created representative institutions to mediate their relationships with larger constituencies. They have promoted a "direct democracy" – an unmediated relationship between leaders and supporters. They mobilize electoral support and bypass political party institutions through the mass media, especially television and public opinion surveys (Robert 2000). In this way, contemporary populist leaders cultivate personalistic loyalties. They exploit popular discontents by attacking established parties and political elites for their corruption and incompetence while portraying themselves as outsiders who represent popular sentiments for change (Roberts 2000: 7).

Supporters of the Populist Criminal Politician

Estrada's political base became the Philippine urban poor; his challengers, including those who mounted the second People Power Revolution to oust him, were mostly middle-class Filipinos. Panizza (2005) clearly identifies most followers of populist leaders as the oppressed who have been prevented by the powerful elite from airing their grievances. Most of the time, according to Panizza, the unheard voices of the poor have burst into history, often in a brutal and uncontrolled way, like a social volcano (*Ibid*.: 14).

The lower sectors of society often have formed the foundation of support for populist criminal leaders. In the cities, these supporters are the squatters, slum dwellers, urban poor (Berner 1997: 22.), and members of the informal sector (Karaos 1991:22) who constitute urban slums. They are the city's craftsmen, who perform menial jobs; some of them are unemployed and engage in petty crime (Panizza 2005: 14-15). Panizza also argues that followers of populist leaders can include members of the upper class who consider themselves disenfranchised and excluded from the public life of society (Panizza 2005:16). Other members of the upper class may shun populist leaders, characterizing them through stereotypes often reserved for their supporters.

Nature and Legal Status of Crime

According to Julian Roebuck and Stanley Weeber (1978: 20), one can describe the nature of political criminal offenses as "rational or irrational", concealed or unconcealed, and violent or nonviolent. Roebuck and Weeber also

classify the offenses of political criminals into three categories: "illegal offenses, surrogate illegal offenses, and paralegal offenses." They explain that offenses can be considered illegal when actors violate governmental law (*Ibid.*: 20). Offenses can be considered surrogate-illegal when the application of the law to the offender is politically motivated. For example, Roeback and Stanley (1978) argue that not all acts of protest against the government are criminal, but that people in power can use legal means to criminalize the behavior of protestors. They offer as an example acts of protest, such as peaceful rallies, that have been criminalized as acts of treason under United States law. Finally, Roebuck and Stanley describe paralegal offenses as those acts that have been criminalized though executive orders or executive powers of the president but do not have a "legislative determination or definition."(*Ibid.*) A good example of decrees that create criminal offenses in the Philippines are those that were issued during the dictatorial presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, such as curfews, prohibitions to travel to other countries, and the banning of protests or any form of political demonstration.

The Man Called Erap

The actor-turned-politician Joseph Marcelo Ejercito Estrada was born April 19, 1937. He grew up in an upper-class family in San Juan, a city of Metro Manila. He is a son of Emilio Ejercito, who was a government engineer, and Maria Ejercito, who was a piano teacher. Estrada's friends call him Erap – a nickname he loves. According to Jose Javier Reyes (2001:239), the nickname Erap is "a further bastardization of the Spanish-derived Pilipino word *kumpare* (good friend), first contracted to *pare* and now turned backward to *erap*." As Reyes explains, this name is "good for political packaging" because the backward pronunciation exemplifies the language of the masses. He has three children with his wife, Loi Estrada, and a total of five more children with his known mistresses.

Joseph Estrada's populist image was originally a product of both showbiz and politics. His first populist campaign for the presidency in 1988 was simple and catered to the basic needs of the poor through such slogans as, *"Jobs for every Filipino worker" and "Adequate food and wages for all…."* Estrada was elected president in 1998 through the support of the poor who voted for him overwhelmingly. He was a popular and charismatic leader who usually questioned the competence and attacked the anomalies of his opponents while projecting himself as a clean outsider who could articulate and respond to the basic needs of the poor. The poor have been attracted to him because of his populist appeal, pro-poor image, the common man roles he made popular

through his movies, and his "ordinary man" ways of acting and talking, which were successfully imprinted in the minds of the masses as they related to him.

There is no doubt that Estrada became a corrupt political official, according to Walden Bello (2004). Among Estrads's many now well-known offenses, as president he received billions of pesos in exchange for protection from illegal numbers games called *jueteng*. Estrada also received campaign contributions and commissions from his friends in exchange for personal economic favors, as Bello narrates in his article "Corruption and Poverty: Barking Up the Wrong Tree" (2005:274):

Lucio Tan[2] lent Estrada his nationwide sales distribution complex for his grassroots campaign network on top of over a billion pesos in campaign financing. In return, the president protected Tan's airline, killed the tax evasion cases against him, and gave him his creditor bank on a silver platter.

Danding Cojuangco[3] backed Estrada up with his political machinery and Estrada returned the favor by giving him back his crown jewel of a corporation[4] (that he had acquired through illegal use of the coconut levy fund) and allowing him to elude land reform.

Mark Jimenez[5] not only contributed campaign funds, but also interceded for the candidate in an attempt to get the White House's blessings. Through the takeovers and mergers they engineered together, Jimenez then gave Estrada hundreds of millions of pesos in kickbacks. The President, in exchange, expressed his gratitude by making sure Jimenez did not fall into the hands of US federal agents (who were hunting Jimenez for an extradition case).

Dante Tan also bankrolled the President's campaign and, like the others, took care of his mistresses, deposited regularly into his "Velarde" bank account, and gifted him with mansions. In exchange, Estrada made sure that Philippine regulators understood perfectly well that Tan was a "good friend" (of the president and needed special attention in the stock exchange).

These acts of corruption by Estrada provided leverage to his political opponent and vice-president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. With the backing of the Catholic Church and civil society, Arroyo used the issue of corruption to organize the middle class and businessmen who were outraged by Estrada's acts of corruption. According to Bello (2005), the middle class's strong opposition to corruption derives from their belief that it is the root cause of Philippine poverty

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[2] Lucio Tan is one of the most prominent business magnates in the Philippines.

[3] Danding Cojuangco is chairman of San Miguel Corporation, the largest food and beverage corporation in the Philippines

[4] San Miguel Corporation

[5] Mark Jimenez is a businessman and former congressman. During Estrada's term as president, Jimenez was appointed as an adviser on Latin American affairs.

and economic stagnation. Bello strongly refutes this deterministic relationship between corruption and Philippine poverty as conceptually and empirically flawed (2004: 304). He argues that corruption, whether or not specific accusations are true, is only a discourse that elite factions (such as Arroyo against Estrada) use to discredit the ruling elite faction and to present themselves as the better alternative. Attacking Estrada through corruption was an effective strategy for diverting peoples' attention from the main cause of Philippine poverty, which, according to Bello, is neoliberalism and its promotion of free market policies that reduce state intervention in economic processes and practices. In addition, Bello argues convincingly that the issue of corruption is used not only by the elite to discredit other elites factions in the government but also by the IMF and the World Bank as they seek more liberal policies for the Philippine economy, through which both institutions could accrue greater benefit. Bello (2005: 299) depicts corruption as a rationale for these institutional policies:

A country should privatize its public services and state corporations and desist from nationalizing resources because the state and its personnel are intrinsically corrupt and inefficient.

A country should liberalize its trade and allow as much imports to come in for two reasons. First, a complicated tariff system will only give corrupt customs officials more opportunities for extortion. More importantly, setting tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and subsidies would only make people spend resources bribing those who are in the position to set them. Protecting domestic industries means protecting local manufacturing elites who often have corrupt ties with those who are in the position to protect them.

On April 25, 2001, Estrada was arrested on various charges including the crime of plunder,[6] illegal acquisition of 4.097 billion pesos in gambling money, and various kickbacks and schemes to divert public funds; the crime of perjury for lying about his declared asset and liabilities; using a fictitious name on a multimillion dollar bank account at PCI Bank; four violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, including hampering the Security and Exchange Commission's investigation into his friends' manipulative stock market practices and a stock market scheme that forced government corporations to purchase shares in companies owned by Estrada's cronies (Angara 2003). Apparently, Erap pocketed more than $82 million in bribes and kickbacks from his friends' stock manipulations and insider trading during his 31 months in office (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, April 26, 2001).

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[6]The charge of economic plunder, which involves amounts of at least P50 million ($1 million), carries the maximum penalty of death.

The table below offers examples of how different pundits described the arrest of President Joseph Estrada. The 2nd column interprets these descriptions for the characters, images and emotions arrest processes evoked; it contains only a fraction of the different images and emotions suggested through the criminal justice processes of Estrada's arrest, which culminated in the uprising of Estrada's supporters.

Arrest of President Joseph Estrada	
Description	**Images, character and emotion**
"Scores of heavily armed police officers broke through a stone-throwing crowd and arrested former Philippine president Joseph Estrada today on corruption charges, locking him in a Spartan jail cell to await trial before an anti-graft court that could sentence him to death." "After the anti-graft court issued the arrest warrant this morning, commando units along with legions of riot police moved in on the protesters." (Chandrasekaran 2001: 20)	**Police** Physically and symbolically powerful **Estrada** -Dangerous criminal -Terrorist -Prisoner -Disruptive of social order -Protected and shielded by his grassroots' supporters
"Estrada, who was forced from office in January, was taken in a dark van from his mansion here to a large police camp, where local television stations filmed the haggard and grim-faced former action movie star being fingerprinted, photographed and examined by a physician." (Chandrasekaran 2001:20)	Estrada as weak, depressed and poor criminal.
"He did not resist arrest; he maintained an enigmatic silence. He meekly went through the rituals of degradation to which all criminal suspects are subjected upon arrest. He was fingerprinted like a common criminal. A mug shot of the former president showed him stoically looking at the police camera, completely stripped of his dignity." (David 2008:197-198)	Estrada as helpless, frightened and degraded common criminal.
More than a thousand policemen accompanied the arresting team in a massive show of force. The vehicle that carried the disgraced president was flanked on all sides by a phalanx of policemen. Television cameras recorded what looked like a funeral cortege on its way to the cemetery. Face to face with his theater of humiliation…. (David 2008:197-198)	Estrada as dangerous criminal being stripped of and separated from his past, including his relationships with the people.

In Estrada's own words,

> "I was arrested here. Over 3,000 policemen surrounded me. They made me look like an ordinary criminal. I was finger printed, they got my mug shot. I was confined all alone, all my cell phones were confiscated, and I was not allowed to talk to the media, or to friends. I was only allowed to talk with my close relatives" (Jovito Salonga, 2008: 427).

Estrada then was jailed in a specially constructed two bedroom prison cell in Camp Crame, Manila.

When *Newsbreak Magazine* asked Estrada if he had foreseen the people power revolt in the event of his incarceration, Estrada answered: "I cannot stop the will of the people. The voice of the people is the voice of God" (Aries Rufo 2008: 367).

The voices of the people that Estrada was depending on were those of the lower-class. Despite his multiple crimes, a Social Weather Station Survey (December 2000) showed that "41% to 51% of the D and E classes did not believe the charges against him" (Bautista 2001: 22). And the Pulse Asia survey showed on November 2000 that 59% of the lower class (D and E) still supported Estrada as their president while the majority of classes A,B,C in the same survey believed he was guilty of all of the charges against him, including using the fictitious Jose Velarde account. They believed Estrada "received *jueteng* money, obtained a share of tobacco funds, amassed wealth in office and granted special favors to family and friends" (Bautista 2001: 20).

Infuriated by the mortifying arrest of their "idol," "president" and "savior," millions of lower class individuals mostly from urban poor communities stormed Malacañang[7] in the early morning of May 1, 2001, in an uprising known as People Power Revolution III. Most Philippine pundits who witnessed the EDSA III uprising described the urban poor who joined the mobilization as "*lumpen*," "criminal," "unwashed," "idiot," "unemployed," "rented," "emotional," "fanatic" and "agitated" individuals who had been fooled, brainwashed and hoodwinked by Estrada and his cohorts (Cunanan 2001, Vitug 2001, de Manila 2001, Gloria and Esguerra 2001).

Erap's Crime as Political Capital among the Urban Poor

To understand the impact of crime on the political system and Filipino perceptions of crime and "criminal politicians," I conducted individual

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[7] The Philippine presidential palace.

interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) among members of two urban poor organizations who voted for Estrada—SANAPA (Samahang Nagkakaisa sa Paninirahan[8]) and SRCC-NTA (San Roque Coordinating Council North Triangle Alliance) – concerning their active support for Estrada. Both the FGD's and interviews probed questions about Erap's supporters' understanding of politics and crime and his supporters' perceptions of Estrada's experience and identity in the political and criminal justice processes. I conducted five FGDs in each organization and several interviews among leaders and members. I conducted the focus group discussions prior to the interviews. The information that I gathered during FGDs increased my understanding of the relationships between crime and politics. I then applied the knowledge I gained from focus groups in formulating my questions for one-on-one open-ended interviews.

The interviews and group discussions focused on the voters' understanding of crime and politics and why and how they did or would support a "criminal candidate" such as Erap. I elicited supporters' perceptions and responses to criminal politicians by asking them open-ended questions. The interviews in focus groups gave respondents freedom to speak up and share experiences related to how they supported Joseph Estrada and how they arrived at the choice to offer support. Open-ended questions did not place limits on respondents' sharing of thoughts, reflections and experiences in relation to the topics of this research.

The main approach of this study is phenomenological. A phenomenological approach is appropriate for this study because the subject is related to a specific phenomenon – a criminalization of politics that involves the experiences and perceptions of politicians and their supporters. Data gathering focused on the perceptions, reflections, memories, experiences and observations of Estrada's supporters. The modern founder of phenomenology is the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Phenomenology refers to knowledge as it appears in consciousness; it is the science of describing what one perceives, senses, and knows in one's immediate awareness and experience. The phenomenological approach involves a return to experience in order to obtain comprehensive descriptions that provide the basis for a reflective structural analysis that portrays the essence of experience (van Kaam 1969: 15). The focus of understanding the subject in phenomenological research is on the persons being studied (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). The phenomenological approach to inquiry includes qualitative research, such as the focus group discussions and interviews employed in this study.

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[8]People's Unity for Security of Housing.

SANAPA and SRCC-NTA were the two urban organizations who most avidly supported Estrada during his arrest. The total members of each organization during the peak of their support for Estrada were 5,000 families for SRCC-NTA and more than 10,000 families for SANAPA. Although conducting a census among these groups was not possible, it appeared that membership in the groups tripled in 2000 after Estrada declared the government would use the land on which the groups lived to provide them security of housing.

The two organizations are located in Quezon City, Philippines. Their neighborhoods are surrounded by many governmental, commercial and transportation establishments such as hospitals, malls, the Philippine Congress, the office of the National Anti-Poverty Commission, a court of appeals, universities, metro rail transit and fast food chains.

Despite the fact that the communities are surrounded by commercial establishments and governmental social service offices and headquarters buildings, most of the members of the two organizations are unemployed. In North Triangle, 60% of the adult members of the 5,000 families who lived in the community in 2001 were unemployed. Seventy percent of the employed worked in private companies, 25% were self-employed and 7% worked in governmental offices. In SANAPA, 70% of the adult members of the 10,000 families were unemployed, most working as sidewalk vendors.

The main goal of both organizations was to gain security of housing within their respective communities. The informal status of their housing aggravated the identity of their communities, giving outsiders the perception that their residency on the land and control over property were illegal and criminal

The two communities started to gain their criminal identity when President Ferdinand Marcos criminalized squatting through Presidential Decree (P.D.) 772 in 1975. The law says that all squatters who occupy public and private lands illegally can be prosecuted and considered criminal. During this time, communities in North Triangle and SANAPA experienced demolitions and the burning of their means of livelihood as sidewalk vendors. Many were put in prison for violent resistance against demolitions. When P.D. 772 was repealed after the lifting of martial law, the communities retained their criminal identity, which was reinforced by the illegal activities of some community members in surrounding establishments. For example, a gang member who lived in North Triangle killed a Philippine Science High School student for refusing to surrender his wallet during a robbery (*Philippine Daily Inquirer* 1997). There

also were weekly robberies of buses, taxis and *jeepneys* (Philippine public transportation) that stop around the two communities.[9]

The North Triangle became a good hiding place for notorious criminals because of the entangled and narrow interior paths along which an outsider easily could become lost and because of the sympathy the neighborhood felt toward criminals who provided resources and favors to residents in their times of need. When the Mayor of Quezon City tried to demonstrate he was capable of stopping crime, "criminals" had nowhere to go but North Triangle and squatter communities at the National Government Center, another region of Quezon City. During raids organized by Mayor Mel Mathay in 1995, suspected criminals and innocent civilians were captured and put in jail without trial.

The members of SRCC-NTA and SANAPA met Estrada when, as president, he went to their communities and declared their land open for disposition.[10] Estrada manifested his alliance with the poor materially as members of SANAPA gained security of housing at the end of Estrada's term and the infrastructure of the SRCC-NTA community improved: during the Estrada presidency they received computers and an elementary school with high tech office facilities, and half of the community was relocated to a decent housing project where they had community buses, cooperatives, schools and health care centers. In response to Estrada's beneficial interventions, members of the two organizations actively demonstrated support for Estrada.

SRCC-NTA and SANAPA became members of the larger coalition of Erap supporters called the Peoples Movement Against Poverty (PMAP). The identities of the communities transformed from sites of squatters and criminals into "Erap Zones" as they became the mass base of Erap supporters[11] during the President's impeachment trial. Leaders of the two organizations, such as Edmundo Siktal, president of SRCC-NTA, and Berto Mañalac, president of SANAPA, assumed important roles in mobilizing the urban poor under PMAP to

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[9] These are based on my personal observations as well as reports in daily tabloid newspapers and personal accounts of residents I interviewed.

[10] A unique factor in the Philippine urban system that predisposes the urban poor to populism is the power of the Philippine president to proclaim government-owned lands as open to disposition to their urban poor occupants (Karaos 2003, p. 2).

[11] The media tagged the communities surrounding the House of Representatives as an Erap Zone when the urban poor who live in those communities cordoned off the Congress against anti-Erap protesters. Leaders of SANAPA and SRCC-NTA claimed that nobody could stage rallies in front of the Congress during the deliberation of means of impeachment against Erap in May 2000.

support Estrada following revelations about his corrupt practices. Edmundo Siktal was PMAP's vice chair, and Berto Mañalac was the head of the organizing committee of PMAP during the heyday of Estrada's administration.

Focus group discussions and individual interviews among members of SANAPA and SRCC-NTA sought understanding of their active support for Estrada through exploring supporters' understanding of politics and crime and their perceptions of Estrada's experience and identity in political and criminal justices processes. Most members of the community organizations treated Estrada the politician as "savior," "symbol of the masses," "compassionate to the needy," "an ordinary man," "a good leader," "president of the poor," a "mirror of justice and democracy," "God" and a "helpful friend who needs help." Some of the respondents who held these perspectives claimed they had no choice but to help Estrada: "Only President Erap showed love to the poor unconditionally, and our support also is unconditional."

Each group member had known Erap through his movies: "I have idolized Erap since he became an actor," and "I grew up watching Erap movies." One respondent stated, "He is a good looking actor with strong charisma".

All members voted for Erap because they considered him "easy to approach," "has pro-poor characteristics," "sincere," "helpful," "sensitive to the needs of his constituents," "brave," "…has strong will" and "knows how to keep his feet on the ground." Estrada received an overwhelmingly high leadership rating of eight to ten (out of ten possible points) among respondents.[12] One of the respondents attested to Erap's pro-poor characteristics by telling a story about how Erap helped her deal with police harassment:

When I was a vendor in San Juan . . . there was a police officer who usually extorts a certain percentage from the sales of the vendors. One day, I refused to remit his percentage. He violently reacted by confiscating my goods. I immediately went to San Juan City Hall and complained about his bad behavior to Erap; back then, he was the Mayor of San Juan. Erap sincerely listened to my complaint; he quickly summoned the extortionist policeman. When the police arrived in his office, without any question he hit the policeman on the face. Since then, Erap became my friend; he helped me to avail of a permanent place in the market as a vendor. (Conching, Interview, September 30, 2008)

Focus group discussion participants at the SANAPA and North Triangle areas asserted that they supported Erap during his impeachment on the basis of their own decisions, reflection and rationalization. They claimed that nobody influenced them in making such decisions: "I decided using my own will to

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[12]If you were to rate his leadership skills from zero (0) for a poor leader to ten (10) for an excellent leader, how would you rate them?

support Estrada. How can you not support the president who represents the poor?" asked one participant. Another stated, "We supported Estrada wholeheartedly, nobody influences us," and "I decided to support Erap because I saw how he was being coerced by the legal system." A handful also asserted that they even used their own money to finance their food and fare during mobilizations: "I attended rallies at my own expense" (Focus group discussion participant, November 7, 2008).

When asked to what extent that they were going to support Erap, group members answered: "As long as he is treated as criminal, oppressed and marginalized by the elite, we will support him,""We supported him no matter what…for the sake of our community and country," "Rain or shine we trooped to the streets to rally behind him," "We continue to support him despite hunger . . . [and] harm from teargas and baton strikes by the police." When asked how they felt during the arrest, they shared the following emotions: "hurt," "became emotional," "cried," and "goose bumps." They also asserted that the arrest of Erap was the death of justice in the Philippine criminal justice system.

When asked how they perceived the crimes of Estrada, members of the two urban poor organizations expressed the consensus that the criminal charges against him had been politically motivated. For them, Estrada's trial on charges of corruption was unjust because, if all politicians are corrupt, they asked, "Why was Estrada the only one who faced the impeachment trial?" And they strongly believed that, "Estrada stole money for the poor, while other politicians steal for their own interests" (FGD participant, November 7, 2008).

For Erap supporters, it was an injustice to put Estrada on trial while other corrupt politicians remained untouchables. The respondents consensually believed that, "corruption is illegal" and that "all the politicians are corrupt." One member stated, "Give me the name of a politician who did not use government money for his own interests" (FGD participant, November 7, 2008). Another explained, "I live in a community of pick pocketers, stealers and kidnappers, but the greatest thieves of all live in the government" (FGD participant, November 7, 2008).

Erap's crimes and his identity as a criminal did not change his supporters' perceptions of him as a good leader and pro-poor politician. The continued support of the two urban poor social movements for Estrada had a tremendous effect on other urban social movements in Quezon City. The SRCC-NTA and SANAPA were members of a coalition of the urban poor in Metro Manila called KALAS before they supported Erap during his ouster as president. KALAS, originally organized by the Kristong Hari Foundation, was comprised of five urban poor organizations: SRCC-NTA, SANAPA, AMPAT, NASALU and KAMPI. As an urban poor coalition, KALAS conducted a major campaign to

repeal Presidential Decree (PD) 772 and to pass RA 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act. These two campaigns benefitted the urban poor in the Philippines.

The SRCC-NTA and SANAPA decided to bolt from KALAS when the other three urban poor organizations (KAMPI, NASALU and AMPAT) decided not to support Estrada. They did not stand behind Estrada due to the strong influence of their leaders, who believed that supporting the weak administration of Estrada was not a good strategy for their cause of obtaining security of housing. After the ouster of Erap, the other three organizations became beneficiaries of the Emergency Employment Program of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. But despite the employment program and the leaders' influence toward not supporting Estrada, most members of the organizations maintained a deep sympathy for the fate of Erap. **"**My shirt is Gloria but my heart remains with Erap" explained one member who was wearing a shirt with the printed logo: "Emergency Employment Program by President Macapagal Arroyo".

Conclusion: How Crime Became Political Capital

Pierre Bourdieu (2004) defines political capital as the monopoly of professional politicians who use the political field as theater for the performative representation of the social world. Bourdieu argues that through "the mystery of performative magic" political representatives "fabricate symbolic representation of families, classes, ethnic groups, regions, nations, and genders" (*Ibid.*: 7).

But political capital will not develop without the peoples' "founded belief or recognition" of the symbolic representations that politicians create and use. As Bourdieu explains, political capital is a transaction between the representatives and the represented. Political capital is, in effect, a *delegated* capital: "... the politician only obtains his political capital – that magical power of representation – from the 'belief' that the group [of people] places in him/her." (Franklin Pilario 2004: 93)

One can gain insight into how Erap transformed and continues to transform his crime into political capital by dissecting the images and symbolic representations that have emerged during his life as a politician and offender in the above-mentioned political and criminal justice processes. I also assess below how his supporters recognized and perceived those symbolic representations.

Erap's Image in Political Processes

According to the Social Weather Station, one of the largest opinion polling institutions in the Philippines, classes D and E gave Estrada 10.8 million votes during the 1998 Presidential Election. This population of the poor defended

him during his ouster, Senate impeachment and court trial. They also continuously supported him during his second attempt to be elected to the Philippine presidency in 2010. Classes D and E comprise the majority of the voting population in the Philippines, compared to the 10% of the voting population in classes A, B, and C.

Members of the SRCC-NTA and SANAPA belong to classes D and E. The criminalization of their identity; their joblessness, lack of security of housing, hunger, and illiteracy; and the marginalization of their cultures, political rights and social welfare form the daily context for the lives of the underclass that Erap calls *masa* (masses) and *mahirap* (poor). During Estrada's ascension as a politician, the masses' arduous desire to satisfy their basic needs and to be represented and recognized had been neglected for decades of elite-run politics characterized by social policies that expressed primarily the interests of the wealthy.

Erap's life as an actor and politician and the accused revealed that he tapped, recognized and performed these often publicly unarticulated desires and the marginalized identity of the poor both in the arenas of politics and the criminal justice system. In his more than one hundred movies, he performed the roles of the poor, market vendor, taxi driver, illiterate, slum dweller and criminal. In these roles he was able to look like the masses:

> "That was why Erap, who was not mestizo, curly- haired, tall, and handsome, became a movie star! You and I look alike! So those of you who have dreams of becoming actors should not lose confidence! Do it! If Erap could do it, so can you! (Joseph Estrada, *Speech for the Masses*, 1992).

Through these performances, Estrada generated fanatic followers called the *bakya*[13] crowd. Upper class movie critics used the term "*bakya crowd*" for the lower class die-hard followers of commercialized Filipino films in the 1960s and 1970s. The term *bakya* refers to lowly, poor-taste adulation of the poor for local films. This term eventually gave way to the more general term *masa* (masses). All films of Erap were called *pang masa* (for the masses) because they captivated lower class audiences. Estrada also became known in his movies as

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[13]The term *bakya crowd* was coined back in the fifties by a prestigious director to describe the mass audience which, he felt, was incapable of appreciating the merits of his award-winning films. The local movie industry, where the term *bakya crowd* originated, classifies Tagalog movies into two major categories. In the lingo of the industry, they are either *commercial* (also known as *bakya*) or *hindi commercial* (also known as *pang-FAMAS*). The commercial movie is anything aimed frankly at the box office (cite____).

"hero of the downtrodden, defender of the poor and helpless" (Barreveld, 2001) and as a crime fighter – "combating drug lords, gangsters, and corrupt politicians" (Biography Research Center 2010).

In politics, Estrada capitalized on pro-poor themes: "jobs for all Filipinos" along with "a decent living wage for all" and "affordable prices for basic commodities." In his speeches, he declared a class war. He usually questioned the competence and attacked the anomalies of his opponents in politics and projected himself as a clean outsider who could articulate and respond to the basic needs of the poor.

He labeled his opponents in politics as "elitist" and "thieves" whose concerns were to enrich themselves. He presented himself as "the victim of a conspiracy by the rich and the church, and of the intellectual snobbery of the educated few" (David 2001:156). He characterized the Church as a hypocritical institution that "viewed the poor contemptuously as people with loose morals" (*Ibid.*). He created a context of class warfare by telling his mass audience that the educated elite from exclusive schools, like those who gathered at EDSA II, would always put down an honest son of the poor who was not able to finish school because of poverty.

During his vice-presidential and presidential terms, he toughened up his image as a crime and terrorist buster. He rounded up drug dens in exclusive subdivisions. He waged war against the groups tagged as terrorist by the government, such as the New People's Army (NPA), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf. He projected himself as Dirty Harry but displayed a gentle heart toward the poor. His anti-Americanism, use of Tagalog language, and influential role in removing the U.S. military bases from the Philippines constructed further his nationalist image.

These representations and projections in Estrada's political performances were homologous with his movie roles; through them Estrada was able to "construct and maintain publicly his identification with the poor." These images which had been constructed previously within the parameters of showbiz became a lived reality for the Filipino poor, at times with material consequences for their communities, as Estrada recreated them through his roles in political processes.

Erap's Image in Criminal Justice Processes

In criminal justice processes, Erap sought and gained the empathy of others by portraying himself as an underdog and just an ordinary criminal. Estrada gained more sympathy from the poor when he was portrayed in the media as a "terrorist," "dangerous criminal," "depressed," and "weak man in his cell." These images and the image of Estrada's arrest – a "grim-faced mug shot

photo" which was repeatedly shown on major television networks – were enough to spark an uprising called "EDSA III".

Also, in contrast to the dangerous criminal image, Estrada was portrayed as a peoples' martyr who was persecuted for having sided with the poor and downtrodden in the documentary film called *Ama ng Masa* (Champion of the Masses). This film was packaged by Estrada's son, Jayvee Ejercito,[14] in a DVD and distributed widely in urban communities during Estrada's trial in order to increase his support among the poor.

In an interview that followed his court trial, Estrada likened himself to a flood victim who had been inundated with false accusations and lies that made him evacuate his office in Malacañang Palace. Jayvee Ejercito had portrayed his Father's ordeal as an archetype of the trial of Christ. He said his father had been betrayed by his former disciples, such as Chavit Singson, whom he referred to as Judas. Jayvee considered those people who were shouting to crucify his father as the same people that his father wanted to serve and save.

Despite the conviction in 2007, Erap maintained his consistent stand that he was innocent of any crime: "This (the court) is the only forum[15] where I could tell the Filipino people my innocence." He swore to "fight to the end'" what he considered a "politically motivated ruling." Erap believed that the populace had acquitted him because of the victories of the candidates he endorsed in three national elections (2001, 2004 and 2007) which took place during his trial and incarceration. For Estrada, the popular vote was the law. He declared, "But it [the ruling] doesn't matter because the people are on our side" (Salonga 2008: 305).

Erap's renunciation of his wrongdoing contributed to the transformation of his crime into political capital. His denial evoked the popular images of Erap as victim rather than offender. Those who accused and tried Estrada became the offenders of justice, a frame constantly suggested by criminalizing processes. His claim of innocence represents the situation of many Filipinos who have been imprisoned and labeled criminal not as a result of guilt, but, they believe, because they were poor and could not afford to pay the justice system. As one respondent argued when asked about the fairness of the criminal justice system: "As long as we have rich people getting richer and poor people going to prison, achieving fairness in the criminal justice system is a long way off." Conrado de Quiros (2001), a respected newspaper columnist for the widely-read English language daily the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, summarized Estrada's images both

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[14]Jayvee Ejercito is the son of Joseph Estrada and his "mistress" Guia Gomez.

[15] Estrada was referring to the public forum that he organized after his conviction in 2007.

in political and criminal justice processes: "a criminal with a heart of gold, a *Tondo* Robin Hood. He is the demigod who rose from the gutter and delivered light to the people" (p.8).

Perception and Recognition of Estrada's Supporters

The populist image of Estrada as savior and symbol of the masses that had been constructed previously within the parameters of showbiz and campaign propaganda became a lived reality when embraced by the Filipino poor. For the two urban poor organizations who joined EDSA III, Estrada was a corrupt politician but "poor" president. In part, as a result of the illegal status of their land and housing and the illegal forms of livelihood of some (illegal numbers games), they conflated the charges against Estrada for illegal acquisitions and uses of public money with criticisms frequently leveled against the poor. When the impeachment trial treated Estrada's acts of corruption as illegal, the two urban poor organizations (SRCC-NTA and SANAPA) felt that they also were on trial. For them, the Philippine criminal justice system existed to protect only the interests of the elite and to condemn the poor, like them, and Estrada, who was one of them.   For them, the illegal identity placed on Estrada by the middle-class and pundits was the same identity through which the poor had been stereotyped by the government elite who used the poor's outside-the-law status to justify demolishing their houses and disrupting their livelihoods, such as numbers games.

Governmental use of the law against Estrada evoked multiple frames of justice among the poor. From their perspective, politicians other than Estrada who had engaged in corruption while in office had been able to retain middle-class support. They included Estrada's predecessor in the presidency, Fidel Ramos,[16] who led Vice-President Arroyo's camp in the ousting of Estrada. Such political inconsistencies among the middle-class strengthened the poor's perception of the class-based-nature of opposition to Estrada. The poor therefore arose in response to a strong sense of injustice when Estrada faced an impeachment trial while other corrupt officials remained beyond the reach of the law. The poor responded to Estrada's positive identification with the injustices of

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[16] Ramos was accused of corruption during his presidency. In February 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee of the 11th Congress recommended the prosecution of ex-President Ramos and eight others for "technical malversation or misapplication of public funds" in connection with the Centennial Expo scam, a recommendation not approved by the Senate but pursued in the Sandigan Bayan against six of his high-ranking officials who were eventually exonerated. Ramos was eventually cleared by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, a Ramos appointee who refused to recuse himself from hearing the high-profile case.

poverty, which they associated with corrupt practices of governance that enriched the ruling oligarchy of the Philippines (David 2001).

The use of criminal justice processes rather than purely political processes helped to delegitimize the contest over Estrada's presidency in the eyes of the poor. EDSA II was a conflict between the elite who had not benefitted from Estrada's corruption versus the elite with whom he had shared the plunder of his political power. One cannot say that former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) was serious in opposing graft and corruption when as vice-president she fought to oust Estrada; she now also faces charges of graft and corruption that apparently have been substantiated through records made public by the Philippine media. The poor who supported Estrada joined a broad range of civil society who tried to oust Arroyo from the presidency[17] many times. Walden Bello (2005) was right when he said that EDSA II was a clash between elites – between Estrada who was in power and Arroyo who used the discourse of corruption to destroy Estrada's credibility so that her elite faction could gain control of the governmental system and use its resources to further their own interests.

EDSA III was a revolution of the poor who felt alienated within such conflict among the elite and their uses of law to control economic processes and property. For the poor, Estrada's eviction from Malacañang through the EDSA II revolt was a catastrophic event that made them realize they did not have a space in society. They fought against their powerlessness through EDSA III and Estrada's return to power. They saw their defense of Estrada in EDSA III as the time for them to end the oppression and marginalization they had felt under prior administrations and which they attributed to undemocratic societal processes and law that did not represent their interests. Their show of defense and love for Estrada was also an act of love and defense for themselves.

Not all politicians and actors are like Erap, who was able to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Filipinos. Money, political machinery and rational platforms are inadequate to become victorious in Philippine politics. (2002: 153) Filipino voters, according to Randy David (Ibid.), "seldom choose their leaders exclusively on the basis of their stand on issues, rather they tend to choose them because of certain personal characteristics that respond to their own unrecognized desire."

Estrada represented, articulated, and performed those unrecognized desires of the poor as an actor, politician and criminal. And the ways the poor recognized, embraced and valued Erap's symbolic performances in political and

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[17] The charges of corruption against Macapagal Arroyo are bribing Comelec officials and the military in the 2004 presidential election.

criminal justice processes transformed Erap's crimes into political capital. Without Erap's crimes, dramatic arrest, and mug shot photo there would have been no EDSA III uprising. And without his trial and incarceration there would be no ongoing sympathy vote for Erap and the candidates he endorses for political office.

"It was the sight of Erap being photographed left, right and front like a common thief" (De Quiros 2001: 8) that culminated in EDSA III. It was the phalanx of shielded police that came to arrest Erap that rushed his approximately one million supporters to his house to form a human shield to protect their idol. It was Erap's melodramatic impeachment and criminal trial that brought tears to the eyes of underclass men and women because it epitomized their own trials and criminalization. In one fell swoop the criminal image of Erap flushed out all the ills of Philippine society that exploded like a social volcano in the EDSA III revolution and translated into victory at the poles for most of the candidates Estrada endorsed in the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections.

If Estrada had been arrested after rather than before national elections (in 2001, 2004 and 2007), if he had been invited to voluntarily submit to arrest rather than being arrested through the use of full military force, and if he had experienced a speedy judicial process instead of long dramatic trial, he would have been less capable of transforming his crime into political capital. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Philippine criminal justice system helped to transform Erap's crime into political capital. After Erap's six-year trial, the arena of the highly politicized criminal justice system had attracted too large a crowd. After Erap was sentenced to *reclusion perpetua* for his crime of plunder, President Macapagal Arroyo quickly pardoned him, and he was released from jail; her administration could not afford to let Erap use his criminal image behind bars to anoint a political proxy for the 2010 presidential election. The president's administration and party knew that the longer they facilitated Estrada's performance as a criminal politician the more effectively he could accumulate a sympathy vote for that election.

Erap, a free man, came in second in the 2010 presidential race.

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THE EXTENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRACTICES IN POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN DISTRICTS 1 AND 2 OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE

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This research on Police Community Relations (PCR) in Districts 1 and 2 of the province of Cavite assessed the extent of the implementation of the practices in police community relations. Purposely, it sought to determine the status of the criminal offenses (index and non-index crimes) during calendar years 2007-08 and 2008-09, and the perception of the police and the community with regard to the extent of the implementation of the practices in police community relation. The study, a descriptive type of research which used a survey method with two sets of validated survey instruments in the gathering data among the two groups of respondents, the 229 police and the 1,322 civilians in Districts 1 and 2 of the province of Cavite. The study revealed that the practices in police community relations in Districts 1 and 2 of Cavite were often implemented. This is supported by the means of 3.71 and 3.89, respectively. On the other hand, the reports on crime statistics for 2007-08 and 2008-09 revealed that criminal offenses (index and non-index crimes) decreased in 2007-08, but increased in 2008-09.

Based on the results of the study, the police have often implemented the practices in police community relations in order to maintain peace and order in both districts. They have constantly intensified their relationship with the *barangay* officials by visitations and monthly conferences. On the other hand, the community residents have observed that the PCR officers have tried their best to reach out to the community through constant and open communications. The community is responsible enough to participate and support the practices implemented by the PCR.

Introduction

The police and the community are inseparable entities where the former protect the latter to ensure the safety of the community at all times. According to Miller (2010) despite the presence of the police in the community, crime happens. However, crimes can be eradicated if the law is strictly implemented, offenders are identified and jailed, and people police their own community. This scenario implies that the government and the Criminal Justice System must work with each other and must improve their services through the full support of the community.

Pace (1991) defines community as a group of a human population living within a geographical area and carrying on a common interdependent life. This explains that each group is classified by different elements of the community

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which refers to geographical, demographical, economic lifestyle and other factors that make people different in terms of the interest of the group and areas of conflict between the community and the criminal justice system. Likewise, Kaminer (1994) describes community as a private and a public place, located somewhere between the individual and big government. Combination of belief, being responsible, and faith in God would help a lot in giving solution to the nation's problem.

The community plays a vital role in learning and developing new ideas, challenges and perspective in life. In a globalizing and high technology nation, an effective government is needed to provide security, peace and order, and governance.

The community involvement is one of the key factors to maintain peace and order and controlling crime. Community is where the police work and provide assistance in their obligation and responsibility as a public servant, in which the law enforcement agency realizes their importance and involvement to this advocacy.

On the contrary, the police primarily interact with the different groups of the society to solve crimes and to strengthen the value of friendship by regularly conducting meetings, planning of different activities and involving them to address issues and concern of the community. Police officers' actions in life begins with the service to the community. The demands for the police to eradicate crimes, fight for the abused and prevent violations are some of the expectations of the community.

According to Pace (1991) community relations implies that to reduce crime in a community, it is necessary for both citizen components and the criminal justice system to cooperate and support one another. Mutual trust, cooperation and support can only be brought about by a number of complex processes. Once the community and the police strengthen the communication system between them, openness and equality will bridge the gap and a more rapport will be observed. This communication greatly enhances the ability to achieve the goal of having a successful Police Community Relations.

Police Community Relation is the development and retention of attitudes and behavior on the part of the police that create mutually supportive relationships between their agency and the community (Florendo, 2008). Kelly (2010) defines Police community relations as partnership agreements between members of the community and the police to solve specific problems prevalent in a particular neighborhood or community. The overall outcome of these relations is an improvement of quality of life in the community. Community policing is a relatively new form of law enforcement, having been introduced after the realization that the police cannot solve all crime problems on their own. There is

a need for the community to take some personal responsibility in their safety. It only explains that the police are the public and the public are the police. The police duty is to serve and protect the community with respect, patience and in consensus of the community needs. In Japan, Police box or koban refers to the two-storied housing with a couple of rooms which were transformed as community stations. The stations are used for the purpose of responding to emergencies, assisting and guarding the people by giving them direction covering the terrain or topography of their area of responsibility, receiving reports from the citizens especially in traffic and rescue, handling lost and found articles or lost children. Patrol officers assigned to kobans are on foot, bicycle or by car and are on duty for eight hours. In rural areas a police officer makes an effort to become part of the community together with his family and helps in performing official tasks. Koban officers survey their area of responsibility twice a year by getting information from the household members or residents and establishment.[1]

On the other hand, the Singapore Police Force adopted the Japanese Koban system known as "neighborhood police post." This was established in 1983 with the rationale of bringing the police to the community. It helps in reducing crime and was accepted by the community due to its front-line activity of giving assistance to them.[2]

Miller et al. state that in the United States of America during the implementation of community policing, policemen were required to have a close relationship with the community, but in 1960s and 1970s their relations were strained. To improve public relations, the community was tapped to help in the prevention of crimes, specifically in block watches and home security programs. By implementing the programs, the police image improved and crime was reduced because of the teamwork between the community and the police.

In the Philippines, according to the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) website, the first implementation of Police Community Relations was done by launching a Police Community Relations month every January as mandated by PD 783 in 1996. To widen the participation, especially of the youth, it was moved to July by virtue of PD 764 with the same goal of continuing to strengthen the relationship of the police and the community. Every year different activities are held at the PNP Regional Office with the aim of building a better communication and to attain peaceful and orderly communities. Such activities are: a project on uplifting the morale of the PNP, seminar on values formation, lectures on responsible parenthood, implementation of Child

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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C5%8Dban
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neighbourhood_Police_Centre

Protection Laws, feeding program, blood donation, launching of the Anti-Trafficking Task Group and others.[3]

Police Community Relations in Region IVA has adopted those activities and are continually strengthened through activities such as *Padyak para sa Kapayapaan,* an initiative program of the PNP Cavite. The message is that the police are instruments of peace, willing to cooperate and to lend a helping hand for the improvement of the province. Furthermore the *Pulis Ko Titser ko* program is continuously being done all over the region and this is in coordination with DEPED wherein the grade 4 students will learn and put into practice the value of love of God, respect and loyalty to the country, and to be a more responsible and law abiding citizens. The program offers lectures by the policemen and policewomen of the PCR office. The interns of the BS Criminology also take part as teachers and teacher aides in order to reach out to all the elementary schools of the province.

In the 21st century, community would open an array of changes in accepting different responsibilities designed to strengthen and harmonize the needed peace and order in the community to which they belong. As the province of Cavite moves forward, it is known for its historical figures and as a vacation landmark, with an increasing population. The condition of the province of Cavite suggests the need of strong security and safety through the joint effort of the community and the police.

Dausan et al. (2009) conducted research entitled *Police Community Relations in the Province of Caite: An Assessment*. This research aimed to assess the extent of police community relations in District II of the province of Cavite such as Trece Martires City, Gen Trias, Tanza, Dasmarinas, Carmona, GMA; and Imus. The study revealed that Police Community Relations in District II was fully implemented as perceived by the police-respondents, and often implemented as perceived by the community-respondents.

It was concluded that Police Community Relations can be strengthened through the efforts of both the community and the police. For this reason, a strategic improvement and implementation of Police Community Relations Programs should be implemented to the fullest.

Since the previous study on PCR in the province of Cavite involved only selected municipalities of Cavite, the researcher was motivated to conduct another study to assess the extent of the practices in PCR in districts 1 and 2 of the province of Cavite such as Bacoor, Cavite City, Rosario, Noveleta, and Kawit, and to determine the status of the criminal offenses (index and non-index crimes) during calendar years 2007-08 and 2008-09 in those districts. It is

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[3] http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/327237/16th-police-community-relations-month

worthy for the community and the police especially in the province to work hand and hand in the prevention of crimes and elimination of threats in order to preserve the safety of the people against danger.

Conceptual Framework

The study was guided by the Input, Process, and Output (IPO) model. As presented in figure 1, the **INPUT** focuses on the crime rate and crime volume, and the extent of the implementation of the police community relations for the crime prevention and control. The **PROCESS** presents the administration of the survey instruments among the respondents; the collection and the tabulation of data; the statistical treatment of data; and the interpretation of data and findings. On the contrary, the **OUTPUT** shows the results of the study with regard to the extent of the implementation of the Police Community Relations (PCR), enhancement of community-police relationship, and the fortification of the crime prevention and program.

| INPUT	PROCESS	OUTPUT
1. Crime Rate and Crime Volume of Index and Non-index Crimes 2. Extent Implementation of Police Community Relation (PCR) 3. Implications of PCR to Crime Prevention and Control	1. Administration of survey instrument to the respondents 2. Collection and Tabulation of Data 3. Statistical Treatment of Data for the Survey Questionnaire 4. Interpretation of Data and Findings	1. Effectiveness of the Police Community Relations (PCR) 2. Enhancement of Community-Police Relationship 3. Fortification of Crime Prevention and Control Program

FEEDBACK

Figure1. The Conceptual Paradigm of the Study

Methodology

The study used the descriptive method of research to measure the extent of the practices in the implementation of the Police Community Relations in Districts 1 and 2 of the province of Cavite. The data included the crime statistics from Kawit, Noveleta, Rosario, Cavite City and Bacoor.

Respondents

The population of the study composed of two groups –the police and the civilians. The District 1 and 2 police strength (population) was 276 and the civilians were composed of 755,705 population. The police-respondents were chosen through random sampling technique. Of the 276, 229 of them served as the sampling, while the 1,322 community-respondents were chosen through convenience sampling.

The two sets of survey questionnaires were adaptations from the previous research on *Police Community Relations in the Province of Cavite: An Assessment*. These were modified by the researcher, and were validated.

Table 1. **Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Gender**

	Community Respondents		**Police Respondents**	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Male	740	56.0	195	85.2
Female	582	44.0	34	14.8
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Table 2. **Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Civil Status**

	Community Respondents		**Police Respondents**	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Single	613	46.4	52	22.7
Married	621	47.0	169	73.8
Widower	52	3.9	7	3.1
Separated	36	2.7	1	.4
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Table 3. **Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Age**

	Community Respondents		Police Respondents	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
20 and below	263	19.9	9	3.9
21-25	243	18.4	31	13.5
26-30	207	15.7	37	16.2
31-35	190	14.4	55	24.0
36-40	209	15.8	47	20.5
41-45	87	6.6	16	7.0
46-50	67	2.0	25	10.9
51-55	29	2.2	9	3.9
56-60	13	1.0	-	-
Over 60	14	1.1	-	-
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Table 4. **Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Educational Attainment**

	Community Respondents		Police Respondents	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
High School Graduate	535	40.5	1	.4
College Undergraduate	412	31.2	9	3.9
College Graduate	319	24.1	186	81.2
Units in MA	36	2.7	26	11.4
MA Graduate	9	.7	7	3.1
Units in Doctoral	1	.1	-	-
Doctoral Graduate	3	.2	-	-
Others	7	.5	-	-
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Table 5. **Frequency Distributions of Respondents by Length of Service**

	Community Respondents		Police Respondents	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
5 years or less	584	44.2	61	26.6
6-10 years	439	33.2	58	25.3
11-15 years	227	17.2	52	22.7
16-20 years	40	3.0	33	14.4
21-25 years	19	1.4	17	7.4
26-30 years	1	.1	4	1.7
31-35 years	6	.5	3	1.3
36 years and above	6	.5	1	.4
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Table 6. **Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Income**

	Community Respondents		**Police Respondents**	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
P5000 and below	567	4.29	3	1.3
P5001-10000	318	24.1	7	3.1
P10001-15000	217	16.4	39	17.0
P15001-20000	137	10.4	76	33.2
P20001-25000	33	2.5	51	22.3
P25001-30000	19	1.4	26	11.4
P30001-35000	4	.3	19	8.3
P35001-40000	7	.5	6	2.6
P40001-45000	8	.6	1	.4
P45001-50000	5	.4	1	.4
P50001-55000	7	.5	-	-
Total	1,322	100.0	229	100.0

Results and Discussion

1.   *The status of the index and non-index crimes (criminal offenses) in calendar years 2007-08 and 2008-09 in districts 1 and 2 of the province of Cavite*

Table 7 shows the Comparative Crime Statistics for calendar years 2007-08. The Cavite Provincial Police Office (CPPO) recorded a crime volume of 1,676 broken down into 987 index crimes and 689 non-index crimes in calendar year 2007. In 2008, the crime volume was 1,615 broken down into 956 index crimes and 659 non-index crimes. A variance of -61 between the 2007-08 crime statistics suggests that the crime volume was decreased by 3.64%.

The average monthly crime rate was pegged at 6.02 in 2008 as compared to 6.24 in 2007 or 3.53% decrease. The index crime rate of 2008 is 3.56 as compared to 2007 which was 3.68. On the other hand, the non-index crime rate of 2008 was 2.45 as compared to 2007 which was 2.57. This means that a difference of 15 crimes solved were identified from 2007-2008 while 46 was the difference between crime unsolved during that same year.

The result of the crime statistics for calendar years 2007-08 implies that the CPPO was guided by their mission to maintain the peace and order. The implementation of the different programs for crime prevention had lowered the number of crime incidents in the different cities and municipalities of the province. Likewise, the leadership of the Chief of Police and the efforts of the men and women behind every station would prove that all of them are in unison

and responsible in fighting crimes to transform Cavite into a peaceful province to live in and to visit at.

Table 7. **COMPARATIVE CRIME STATISTICS 2007-08**

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSE	2007	2008	Variance	%
Crime Volume	1676	1615	-61	-3.64%
Index Crimes	987	956	-31	-3.14%
Crimes vs Persons	555	559	4	0.72%
Murder	168	164	-4	-2.38%
Homicide	123	102	-21	-17.07%
Physical Injury	220	239	19	8.64%
Rape	44	54	10	22.73%
Crimes vs Property	432	385	-47	-10.88%
Robbery	204	144	-60	-29.41%
Theft	228	241	13	5.70%
Non-Index Crimes	689	659	-30	-4.35%
A M C R	6.24	6.02	-0.22	-3.53%
Index Crime Rate	3.68	3.56	-0.12	-3.26%
Non-Index Crime Rate	2.57	2.45	-0.12	-4.67%
Crime Solved	1469	1454	-15	-1.02%
Crime Unsolved	207	161	-46	-22.22%
Index Crime Sol Efficiency (%)	81.66%	85.98%	4.32%	5.29%
Non Index Crime Sol Eff (%)	96%	98%	1.77%	1.84%
Crime Sol Efficiency (%)	87.66%	91.08%	3.42%	3.90%

*A M C R – Average Monthly Crime Rate

Table 8 presents the crime statistics for calendar years 2008-09. The average monthly crime rate was pegged at 6.02 in 2008 as compared to 12.85 in 2009. The variance 6.83% suggests that there was an increase in crime volume. The index crime rate of 3.56 of 2008 and 7.33 in 2009 is 7.33 yielding a variance of 3.77. This implies that the index crime rate in 2008 had increased in 2009. More so, the non-index crime rates of 2.45 in 2008 and 5.52 in 2009 yielded a variance of 3.07 suggesting that the non-index crime rate from 2008 had increased in 2009.

Table 8 also shows that the index crime solution efficiency in 2008 was 85.98 % while 78.24 % in 2009. This suggests that the index crime solved in 2009 was less compared to index crime solved in 2008. The variance between

2008 and 2009 index crime solution was 7.74 %. The overall crime solution efficiency of Cavite PPO was 90.49% in 2008 and 84.96% in 2009.

As the crime volume increased in 2009, many factors are to be considered such as population, number of policemen and its ratio per number of residents, and the hiring status of the populace. This may affect the competence of our policemen but still they have done their part to solve almost half of the crime reported. Also, this will be an excellent guide to plan more programs and link the community to be more supportive and helpful in the prevention of crimes and the advocacy of having a peaceful and quiet community in which to reside.

Table 8. **Comparative Crime Statistics 2008-09**

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSE	2008	2009	Variance	%
Crime Volume	1536	3450	1914	124.61%
Index Crimes	904	1967	1063	117.59%
Crimes Vs Persons	516	1129	613	118.80%
Murder	157	128	-29	-18.47%
Homicide	86	115	29	33.72%
Physical Injury	222	819	597	268.92%
Rape	51	67	16	31.37%
Crimes Vs Property	388	838	450	115.98%
Robbery	150	369	219	146.00%
Theft	238	469	231	97.06%
Non-Index Crimes	632	1483	851	134.65%
A M C R*	6.02	12.85	6.83	113.46%
Index Crime Rate	3.56	7.33	3.77	105.84%
Non-Index Crime Rate	2.45	5.52	3.07	125.50%
Crime Solved	1390	2931	1,541	110.86%
Crime Unsolved	146	519	373	255.48%
Index Crime Sol Efficiency (%)	85.98%	78.24%	-7.74%	-9.00%
Non Index Crime Sol Eff (%)	98%	94%	-4.14%	-4.22%
Crime Sol Efficiency (%)	90.49%	84.96%	-5.53%	-6.12%

*A M C R – Average Monthly Crime Rate

2. *The extent of the implementation of the practices in Police Community Relations (PCR) in Districts 1 and 2 of Cavite as perceived by the community-respondents*

Table 9 is the mean distribution on the extent of implementation of the practices in Police Community Relations as perceived by the community-respondents. It can be seen from the table that item 10 such as *the PNP helps the citizens in settling and resolving the problems in the barangay or community* ranked 1 with a mean of 3.78, and is interpreted as often implemented. The other items such as **t***he PNP serves the community very well by providing quality service; the PNP helps in resolving problems in every barangay or community; the PNP conducts lectures and seminars in the barangays and schools regarding the ways on how to eradicate or fight criminalities* ranked 2, 4 and 5, respectively. The mean ratings such as 3.77, 3.73, and 3.69 support this data. While *the PNP responds and gives solutions on the problems and concerns of the citizens***;** and *the PNP entertains the comments, opinions and suggestions from the community on how to eradicate or fight criminalities* both ranked 3 and with a mean of 3.74. These items were perceived by the community-respondents as often implemented. Other items that were perceived often implemented were as follows: *the PNP is active in coordinating with the citizens and officials of the barangay in order to know the problems/concerns in the community; the PNP conducts programs to build and enhance the good relationships between the police and the community; the PNP gives the community knowledge and information pertaining to new laws, rules and ordinances; and the PNP posts and releases notices pertaining to their crime prevention and PCR programs in the community* ranked 6, 7, 8, and 9, and with mean ratings of 3.68, 3.67, 3.66, 3.62, respectively. The perception of the community-respondents as regards the extent of the implementation of the practices in Police Community Relations was often implemented. The overall mean 3.71 supports this interpretation.

Table 9. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of the Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Community-Respondents**

PRACTICES IN PCR	MEAN	RANK	Interpretation
Item 10. The PNP helps the citizens in settling and resolving the problems in the barangay or community.	3.78	1	Often Implemented
Item 9. The PNP serves the community very well by providing quality service.	3.77	2	Often Implemented

Table 9. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of the Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Community-Respondents** *(Continued)*

Item 7. The PNP entertains the comments, opinions and suggestions of the community on how to eradicate or fight criminalities	3.74	3	Often Implemented
Item 8. The PNP responds and gives solutions on the problems and concerns of the citizens.	3.74	3	Often Implemented
item 5. The PNP helps in resolving problems in every *barangay* or community.	3.73	4	Often Implemented
Item 1. The PNP conducts lectures and seminars in the *barangays* and schools regarding the ways on how to eradicate or fight criminalities	3.69	5	Often Implemented
item 6. The PNP is active in coordinating with the citizens and officials of the barangay in order to know the problems/concerns in the community	3.68	6	Often Implemented
Item 4. The PNP conducts programs to build and enhance good relationships between the police and the community.	3.67	7	Often Implemented
Item 3. The PNP gives the community knowledge and information pertaining to new laws, rules and ordinances	3.66	8	Often Implemented
*Item 2.*The PNP posts and releases notices pertaining to their crime prevention and PCR programs in the community.	3.62	9	Often Implemented
OVERALL MEAN	**3.71**		**Often Implemented**

Legend:
> 5 = (4.50 – 5.00 or 86 to 100% of the time) = Fully Implemented (FI)
> 4 = (3.50 – 4.49 or 66 to 85% of the time) = Often Implemented (OI)
> 3 = (2.50 – 3.49 or 36 to 65% of the time) = Seldom (SI)
> 2 = (1.50 – 2.49 or 16 to 35% of the time) = Rarely Implemented (RI)
> 1 = (1.00 – 1.49 or 0 to 15% of the time) = Not Implemented (NI)

Table 10 presents the mean distribution on the extent of the implementation of the practices in Police Community Relation as perceived by the police-respondents. The data show that the items on *Chief of Police practices and emphasizes broad-based participation in policy making* and *police officer considers the comments and suggestions of the public officials in the planning of*

programs and activities ranked 1 and 2 and with mean ratings of 4.00 and 4.04, respectively and both are interpreted as often implemented. This suggests that the Chief of Police has considered the important role of the police in policy making; likewise, the police officers have demonstrated democracy in the planning of programs and activities that will deepen the relationship between them and the community.

Items such as *Chief of Police decides on what plans and programs for PCR should be implemented; the Chief of Police assigned police officers who are experienced in dealing with the community;* and *police officers welcome the comments, opinions, and suggestions of the community and use them as basis for the formulation of organizational policies, methods and procedures* ranked 3 and interpreted as often implemented. The mean 3.94 supports this data. This implies that the Chief of Police and the police have exerted effort to reach out with the community.

It can also be gleaned from Table 10 that the lowest rank among those 20 items were on *police identify the needs in the implementation of the PCR plans and programs* and *Police Community Relations Officer socializes or interacts with the community to gather information for the planning of the PCR programs*. These items both ranked 13 with a mean rating of 3.80, and interpreted as often implemented. This suggests that the police have often realized the needs for the implementation of PCR, and this also suggests that the community is a source of information for the identification of PCR programs.

The overall mean as regards the police-respondents' perception of the extent of implementation of the practices in PCR is 3.89 which is interpreted as often implemented.

Table 10. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Police-Respondents**

PRACTICES IN PCR	MEAN	RANK	Interpratation
Item 6. Chief of police practice and emphasize broad-based participation in policy making.	4.04	1	Often Implemented
Item 7. Police officer consider the comments and suggestions of the public officials in the planning of programs and activities.	4	2	Often Implemented

Table 10. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Police-Respondents** *(Continued)*

Item 13. Chief of Police decides on what plans and programs for PCR should be implemented in his area of concerned.	3.94	3	Often Implemented
Item 18. The Chief of Police assigned police officers who are experienced in dealing with the community.	3.94	3	Often Implemented
Item 19. Police officers welcome the comments, opinions, and suggestions of the community and use them as bases for the formulation of organizational policies, methods and procedures.	3.94	3	Often Implemented
Item 17. Police officers are required by the chief of police to undergo a series of seminars or trainings that will help in the improvement of all aspects of the PCR.	3.93	4	Often Implemented
Item 20. Police officers are open-minded to any problem that involves the relationship between the community and the police to immediately respond and formulate a solution.	3.91	5	Often Implemented
Item 14. The police and the community officials meet or attend seminars to come up with PCR programs suited to the needs of the community.	3.9	6	Often Implemented
Item 16. Chief of police identifies the problems in PCR to come up with the solution for the enhancement of the organizational policy and training of the officer.	3.9	6	Often Implemented

Table 10. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Police-Respondents** *(Continued)*

Item 8. The group formulating the programs are composed of PCO and PNCO.	3.89	7	Often Implemented
Item 4. All organizational levels participate in a two-way communication with the citizens and community leaders	3.86	8	Often Implemented
Item 5. All police personnel commit themselves for the implementation and success of PCR.	3.86	8	Often Implemented
Item 15. Police officers are given seminar to enhance their inter-personal and intra-personal relationships.	3.86	8	Often Implemented
Item 12. Police officers coordinate with the other agencies with regard to PCR activities.	3.85	9	Often Implemented
Item 2. Police discuss with the citizens what are the PNP plans and programs for a specific time and date.	3.84	10	Often Implemented
Item 1. Police communicate the philosophy and concepts of PCR through open forum, personal and news media or citizen's meetings.	3.83	11	Often Implemented
Item 11. Police Community Relations Officer uses the available data and information as basis for the for the formulation of PRC plans and programs.	3.83	11	Often Implemented

Table 10. **Mean Distribution on the Extent of Implementation of the Practices in Police Community Relation (PCR) as Perceived by the Police-Respondents** *(Continued)*

Item 3. Police officers involve the elected barangay and local officials in the formulation and implementation of the PCR programs and activities.	3.82	12	Often Implemented
Item 9. Police identify the needs in the implementation of the PCR plans and programs.	3.8	13	Often Implemented
Item 10. Police Community Relations Officer socializes or interacts with the community to gather information for the planning of the PCR programs	3.8	13	Often Implemented
OVERALL MEAN	**3.89**		**Often Implemented**

Legend:

5 = (4.50 – 5.00 or 86 to 100% of the time) =   Fully Implemented (FI)
4 = (3.50 – 4.49 or 66 to 85% of the time) =   Often Implemented (OI)
3   = (2.50 – 3.49 or 36 to 65% of the time) =   Seldom (SI)
2 = (1.50 – 2.49 or 16 to 35% of the time) =   Rarely Implemented (RI)
1 = (1.00 – 1.49 or 0 to 15% of the time) =   Not Implemented (NI)

Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the results of the study, the police and the community have established a positive relationship to eradicate crimes and maintain peace and order in both districts. The police have constantly intensified their relationships with the *barangay* officials by visitations and monthly conferences. On the other hand, the community residents have observed that the PCR officers have tried their best to reach out to the community by often implementing the practices in PCR.

Further, the crime statistics reports for calendar year 2007-08 and 2008-09 served as a guide for the police headquarters to increase the PNP crime solution efficiency and to maintain the peace and order of the community.

Realizing the importance of the Police Community Relations through various practices, it is important to note that there is a need to fortify the value of love for God, family and country through formal and informal education. *Barangay* and *Sanggunian Kabataan* officials should be aware of and educated of their important roles and responsibilities as partners of the PNP.

With regard to the PNP, there must be additional policemen to be deployed in a city or municipality with large populations. There should be an additional police precinct that will strengthen information dissemination of the different programs or activities for information and guidance. Posting of banners and tarpaulins in different identified areas for other information on crime prevention tips and activities of the PNP should be undertaken.

Further, universities and schools can be tapped to guide students to become aware of the plans and programs of the PNP. This will serve as academic connections for their safety and security. On the contrary, the national and local governments must allocate budget to support the programs and activities that eliminate crimes, and to increase the crime prevention control awareness program of the community.

Lastly, it is recommended that the results of this study be disseminated to all concerned agencies for their information and guidance in regard to the extent of the implementation of the Police Community Relation (PCR), enhancement of community-police relationship and the fortification of the   crime prevention and control program. Similar studies should be undertaken particularly in Districts 5, 6, and 7 since the extent of implementation of practices in PCR were done in Districts 1-4. More importantly, the results of this study may be used in the assessment of Crime Registrar of the province of Cavite that may serve as the basis for the development of Crime Mapping electronic data base systems for CAVITE PPO and REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

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The Road Not Taken: Political Action and the Crisis of Democratic Values and Stability in Post-Independence Equatorial Guinea

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In the half a decade leading up to the independence of Equatorial Guinea in October 1968, attempts were made to establish a stable democratic government in the territory. However, authoritarianism has characterised politics and governance in the country in the over four decades of its existence as an independent state. This article explores the crisis of democratic values and stability in Equatorial Guinea since independence and attempts to explain why the country has been impervious to the wave of democratisation that has blown across Africa since the 1980s. This is against the background of the suggestion by some scholars that Equatorial Guineans have since the late colonial period developed a distaste for democratic government. The article states that the nature of politics and governance in Equatorial Guinea in the past four decades has been the same both under military regime and civilian administrations and accordingly contends that although the country has had civilian governments for much of the time, there has been an almost total absence of democratic values. Developments in the country since 1968 reveal that the generality of the people desire political participation and a government that promotes freedom, liberty and basic rights. We therefore disagree with the argument that Equatorial Guineans have a distaste for democracy. It is concluded that drastic reforms would be needed for democratic values and stability to be entrenched in Equatorial Guinea.

Introduction

Equatorial Guinea was under civilian administrations for forty of its forty-three years of existence as an independent state up to 2011. It was only from 1979 to 1982 that it experienced military rule after the overthrow of its first president and brutal dictator, Francisco Macias Nguema. Yet, Equatorial Guinea's political development has been characterized almost entirely by dictatorship and tyranny for over four decades. This article interrogates why Equatorial Guinea has experienced such intense absolutism under supposedly civilian governments that have claimed to be 'democratic'. It explores the crisis of democratic stability in the country and the impact on the efflorescence of democratic values. The nature of constitutional evolution and the general pattern of political development of Equatorial Guinea since independence are equally

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analyzed to understand the impact of political action on the development of political values and stability.

Spain's colonial authorities attempted to establish a functional and democratic political system for Equatorial Guinea in the course of the independence process from 1966 to 1968. A constitution that was thought would promote democracy and good governance while at the same time addressing the complexities of the internal structures of Equatorial Guinea was drawn up in 1968. Some analysts argue that there was as much in the constitution that could promote absolutism as democratic values and also that it would have been surprising if Franco's Spain had succeeded in establishing a truly democratic structure for Equatorial Guinea considering the fact that Spain itself was under an authoritarian government in the 1960s (Carr 1982: 379-387; Payne 1962: 199-202; Clissold 1969: 119-120; Roberts 2004: 955). Nevertheless, the election that the Spanish colonial authorities conducted which ushered in the first post-independence government in Equatorial Guinea was adjudged to be free, fair and transparent. Francisco Macias Nguema who emerged president scored the highest votes in both the first round of balloting and the run-off (Ndongo-Bidyogo 1968: 16; Liniger-Goumaz 1988:99).

A number of factors, including ethnicity and regional identity, might have played a role in the election of Macias. With the benefit of hindsight, he certainly was not the best candidate. But Macias was the preferred candidate of the majority of Equatorial Guineans and the choice had to be respected. Indeed, there were indications that Macias was not Spain's preferred candidate. Ondo Edu, Macias' main challenger, was the preferred candidate of the Spanish government (Fegley 1989: 163). Edu had been a moderate and had not been fiercely anti-Spanish during the independence struggle. This had endeared him to the colonial authorities and had made Madrid appoint him Head of Government in May 1964. Edu served for four years as leader of the autonomous government and during the period he generally did well. The Spanish government was very comfortable with him. This helped him secure Spain's endorsement in the contest for the presidency. The fact that Ondo Edu eventually lost the presidential election to Macias reveals that Spanish leaders attempted to follow democratic principles by conducting free, fair and transparent elections.

These measures, notwithstanding, Macias Nguema became authoritarian as soon as he took office. He moved swiftly against both real and perceived opposition to his government both within and outside Equatorial Guinea. By early 1969, tyranny and brutality had become the most prominent features of Equatorial Guinea's politics. The political system adopted at independence was the presidential structure with extensive powers for the president. There was a

bicameral legislature which was reduced to a unicameral one in the 1980s and is currently composed of one hundred members.

Under Macias Nguema, tyranny and political murder grew progressively and Equatorial Guinea quickly became a one party state. Moreover, no effort was made to conduct elections and the other arms of government virtually disappeared. Judgments reflected the pronouncements of Macias and law-making became a function of the dictator and the small click that surrounded him. Indeed, judges and legislators either went into hiding or fled the country in the atmosphere of mass murder that engulfed the country. No effective governance took place in Equatorial Guinea in the charged political milieu from 1969 to 1979. Critical infrastructure was abandoned and almost everything dilapidated. By the time Macias was overthrown in August 1979, Equatorial Guinea was in a state of total paralysis and the country acquired the distinction of being one of the world's worst governed countries (Sundiata 1990: 68-69, 132-133; Fegley 1989: 80-81). Under the circumstances, democratic ideals and stability were the last things anyone could associate with Equatorial Guinea (Meredith 2006: 239-241). Thus, the structures of democracy and good governance that the Spanish colonial authorities and the United Nations as well as leaders of the independence movement attempted to establish in Equatorial Guinea at independence were dismantled by Macias who chose the path of tyranny and authoritarianism. At some point, a good number of the small click that worked closely with Macias in his brutal rule became concerned about their own safety and survival as well as the country's. It was from among these that the overthrow of Macias was organized in August 1979 (*Afrol News* 2001: 4).

Hopes of a democratic revival and the establishment of good government were raised following the overthrow of Macias. It is paradoxical that it was the military government of Obiang Nguema which replaced the civilian and supposedly democratic government of Macias Nguema that was expected to re-establish democratic structures and promote democratic values and stability from late 1979 (Liniger-Goumaz 1989: 65; *Afrol News*, 2001: 4). For some time, it seemed as if the Obiang government was on the right course in setting Equatorial Guinea on the path of political stability and good governance. A transition program was established which ushered in a civilian government in 1982. The fact that Obiang himself contested the presidency and won meant a mere change from military to civilian administration, and he has remained president for forty-two years and counting. Obiang and his party won all the parliamentary and presidential elections in from 1982 to 2009 (Africa Elections Database 2010: 1-4; Tran 2009: 1). The country actually functioned as a no-party and one-party state from 1982-1993 and experiments with multi-partyism were undertaken only in response to sustained pressure from both within and outside the country. Even

then, manipulations and consistent harassment from the government at different levels have emasculated the other parties and seriously limited their capacity to function (Amnesty International 2009: 1-3). Many of the vices of the Macias era have also returned, although Obiang has not been as erratic and violent as Macias (McSherry 2006: 2; Historyworld 2000: 1). The travails of democracy and good governance in Equatorial Guinea have persisted for over four decades. In this article, we examine the crisis of democratic values and stability in Equatorial Guinea, the intricate issues in the country's political evolution and the prospects for the future.

Theory and the Crisis of Democracy in Equatorial Guinea

Democratic theory has explored the meaning and nature of democracy as a political concept and a system of government. Scholars have also broached the issue of what constitutes democratic values and stability, and whether there could be degrees of democracy – the question of whether one government could be more democratic than another. Attempts are made herein to discuss some of the arguments because they help to explain aspects of the political development of Equatorial Guinea. The analysis is against the background of the popularity of democracy as a system of government since the 20th century, what one source describes as "one of the most dramatic and significant events in political history," and the tendency for almost every kind of government to claim to be democratic: from liberalism to socialism to monarchy and even militarism and anarchism (Heywood 2000: 125-126; Huntington 1991: xiii-xv). This has been the experience of Equatorial Guinea as well where the leaders have claimed to be democratic on account of the conduct of periodic elections in the country since the 1990s. Indeed, President Obiang Nguema's party, the *Partido Democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial* (PDGE), is described by those in power as the country's truly "Democratic Party".

Political theorists generally agree that the issue of what constitutes the meaning, nature, principles and dimensions of democracy remains a moot question. "Many meanings attach to the word democracy," notes the scholar Bernard Crick. He explains:

> "If there is one true meaning, then it is, indeed as Plato might have said, stored up in heaven; but unhappily has not yet been communicated to us. The word is what some philosophers have called 'an essentially contested concept,' one of those terms we can never all agree to define in the same way because the very definition carries a different social, moral, or political agenda." (Crick 2002: 1)

Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, James Hyland, and Andrew Heywood, among numerous other political theorists, agree on the imprecise nature of the understanding of democracy as a concept and a system of government. "A term that can mean anything to anyone is in danger of meaning nothing at all," notes Andrew Heywood in his analysis of the differing understanding of the meaning of democracy (Heywood 2002: 68; Schumpeter 1994: 250-256). Even then, there are a number of essential elements that are generally accepted to be critical to a system of government to be accepted as democratic which is why analysts are able to describe as ludicrous the claim of some tyrannical and authoritarian leaders to being democratic.

The difference in the application of the meaning of democracy by political leaders arises mainly from the popularity and acceptability of democratic governments generally around the world and the eagerness of almost every government to lay claim to it. Everyone is a democrat now or at the very least wants to be one. Accordingly, even when a system and approach to governance are antithetical to generally accepted principles of democracy, many political leaders want to describe it as democratic and lay claim to democratic credentials. As Heywood argues:

> "The problem with democracy has been its very popularity, a popularity that has threatened the term's undoing as a meaningful political concept. In being almost universally regarded as a 'good thing,' democracy has come to be used as a little more than a 'hurray! word,' implying approval of a particular of a particular set of ideas or system of rule." (Heywood 2002: 68-69)

Even Huntington states in his famous work *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century* that: "I have written (this book) because I believe that democracy is good in itself and that... it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability (and) international peace." (Huntington 1991: xv) The tendency by numerous political leaders to describe their governments as democratic when their style of governance differs widely from one another has raised the question of whether it is possible to sketch any acceptable meaning of democracy.

It is noteworthy that among scholars, the difference in the understanding of democracy and its principles arises mainly from the adoption of different perspectives and emphasis. The Schumpeterian (and Huntingtonian) definition, for instance, focuses on the procedural dimension of democracy and therefore contends that a state or organization is democratic only to the extent that it adopts a system in which the most important decision makers emerge though

transparent, free, fair, periodic and all-inclusive elections. Samuel Huntington generally shares this view of democracy and states that "democracy involves the two dimensions – contestation and participation." Arising from this understanding, Huntington argues that:

> "Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic." (Huntington 1991: 7, 10)

This reveals Huntington's emphasis on the procedure of election or the selection of important decision makers as the fundamental issues in the understanding of democracy.

Other analysts have emphasised freedom, liberty and especially equality as the most important principles of democracy in the mode of Alexis de Tocqueville. They do not agree entirely with the perspective of Huntington about the primacy of the mode of selecting leaders in the understanding of democracy. Howard Fienberg has actually criticised this perspective for what he regards as Huntington's rather narrow description of democracy which fails to adequately address other important issues such as liberty and freedom (Fienberg 1996: 1). But the scholars that emphasise freedom, liberty and equality equally agree that elections conducted in a free, transparent and all-inclusive manner are vital as they are an important way to express freedom, liberty and the rights to representative government. Even Huntington, with all his emphasis on electoral procedure also notes that democracy "equally implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns." (1991: 7) The issues are therefore interrelated.

The reality is that the selection of important decision-makers through free and fair elections implies freedom and liberty just as the exercise of freedom implies the right to select leaders and be a part of the governing process. Although democratic principles are complex and multidimensional, the different strands are intertwined (Hyland 1995: 81; Heywood 2000: 125-126). A measure of consensus thus exists and the perspectives are not mutually exclusive as such. This has made it possible to evaluate the democratic credentials of leaders and assess different governments to make concrete statements about whether they are democratic or not. It is in line with this understanding that we have been able to analyze the nature of politics and governance in Equatorial Guinea from 1968 to 2011. The application of the generally accepted principles of democracy has

made it possible to dismiss any spurious claims to democracy by governments that have been tyrannical and authoritarian such as Equatorial Guinea has had almost throughout the post-independence period.

The analysis above also helps to understand the nature of democratic values and stability. In modern times, from Alexis de Tocqueville to James Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, James Hyland, Bernard Crick, Benjamin Barber, Howard Fienberg, and Richard Joseph, among others, the promotion of freedom, equality and liberty, and the defense of basic rights are regarded as fundamental to any democratic arrangement. (De Tocqueville 2002; Dahl 1956; Schumpeter 1994; Huntington 1991; Hyland 1995; Crick 2002; Barber 2004; Joseph 2001) Some have emphasised the right to representative government while others have stressed personal, economic and political freedom, but all agree that democracy is multidimensional and a combination of these principles is crucial to a democracy, properly so-called. As Crick explains:

> "There is democracy as a principle or doctrine of government; there is democracy as a set of institutional arrangements or constitutional devices; and there is democracy as a type of behaviour." (Crick 2002: 5)

The reality is that emphasis on different democratic principles by analysts is always influenced by what aspect of democracy is discussed.

An application of these ideas to the political development of Equatorial Guinea leads to the conclusion that the foundations of a democratic government were laid at independence in 1968. As already noted, the electoral process that ushered in the first post-independence government was very well organized and the leaders that emerged from the elections were the preferred representatives of the majority of the people. In addition, although the independence constitution gave enormous powers to the president, it also contained a number of provisions to advance basic rights and protect minorities. The abandonment of democratic values began with the erratic approach and excesses of the country's first president Macias Nguema who abandoned constitutional provisions and violated rights with impunity. Democratic values have never been restored in the country over four decades after as Macias' successor, Obiang, has continued in a similar fashion as his uncle. Political action on the part of Equatorial Guinea's leaders has therefore been a central issue which has negatively affected democratic stability and the expansion of democratic values. As Robert Dahl has observed for the United States, there is the need for the culture of representative government and ideals of freedom and liberty to take root for democratic stability to be achieved. It is the consensus on basic values, not constitutional

provisions as such (even though that too is important), that ensures an enduring democracy. (Dahl 1956: 131-132, 143) Anti-democratic political action since 1968 prevented the development of such a consensus in Equatorial Guinea although a large number Equatorial Guineans have managed to maintain a high level of democratic consciousness over the years. (Sundiata 1990: 81-83; Evuna 2001)

A related issue is that of democratic stability which Huntington describes as "a central dimension in the analysis of any political system." (1991: 11) This generally refers to the degree of institutionalization of democratic values or the extent to which democratic principles are expected to be applied in the administration of a country or any other political unit. A wide range of activities shape the pattern of democratic stability in any country. One of the most important is the nature of political action by important decision-makers. Another is the degree of democratic consciousness which makes the people insist on the application of democratic principles in the governing process. In the case of Equatorial Guinea, political action in the post-independence period has been generally antithetical to democratic values. Regarding popular attitudes toward democracy in a country, different studies have revealed that where democratic consciousness is prominent, the people usually explore legitimate democratic institutions to address grievances and promote democratic stability; but where such institutions are non-existent, citizens resort to non-formal political strategies such as riots and civil disobedience. Here, the role of pro-democracy and other civil society groups is crucial for organized action to be effective. (Zweig 2002: 1-2) External pressure and support for popular democratic demands is another important factor in this regard. In all of these, how receptive or impervious leaders of a political unit are to popular demands is a key issue.

The analysis of the Equatorial Guinean experience in the post-independence period reveals that popular attitude has been favorably disposed to democratic values. Even before independence, the people agitated for representative government and some minority groups such as the Bubi are known to have resisted the political structure that was being established in 1967 and 1968. It took the persuasion of the United Nations and some constitutional safeguards for them to reluctantly accept the framework for independence. The absence of legitimate democratic institutions for the citizenry to promote democratic values compelled the people to increasingly resort to violence following the onset of the Macias Nguema dictatorship. However, the government violently crushed protests and any perceived opposition and the people began to flee to exile in record numbers. Various sources indicate that about a third of the country's population was either killed or fled to exile between 1968 and 1979. (Meredith 2006: 239-240; *Afrol News* 2001: 3) Things

improved slightly after the removal of Macias Nguema from power in 1979 but authoritarianism has persisted with the result that violent protests have continued apace. (McSherry 2006: 6-7; Amnesty International 2009:2; *Afrol News* 2001: 5) Democratic consciousness in Equatorial Guinea has been lively despite the asphyxiating political environment.

Pattern of Politics and Governance in Post-Independence Equatorial Guinea

The presidential elections that ushered in the first post-independence government in Equatorial Guinea were held on 22 September and 29 September 1968. The first round of elections was contested by four political parties: MUNGE, having Ondo Edu as its candidate; MONALIGE, represented by Ndongo Miyone; Union Bubi, led by Edmondo Bosio Dioko; and *Grupo Macias*, represented by Francisco Macias Nguema. (Fegley 1989: 53) In the first round, Macias Nguema scored the highest number of votes with 36,716 votes, followed by Ondo Edu with 31,941 votes. Since none of the candidates could secure a clear majority, a run-off had to be conducted for the candidates with the two highest votes on 29 September 1968. Ondo Edu, who had been the leader of the autonomous government appointed by Spain shortly before independence, was confident of winning alone and so formed no coalition with any of the other parties. Macias Nguema, however, allied with the other two parties. In the run-off, Macias Nguema won very easily. He secured 47,000 votes against Ondo Edu's 24,000. (Ndongo-Bidyogo 1968: 16; Liniger-Goumaz 1988:99) It was this result that brought Macias Nguema to power as Equatorial Guinea's first president on 12 October 1968.

Macias Nguema wasted no time after he became president to reveal his undemocratic credentials. By the end of 1968, less than three months after taking office, Macias had begun to go after real and perceived enemies and began to manifest dictatorial tendencies. One of Macias' earliest targets was Ondo Edu, who had served as head of the autonomous government and contested the presidential election against Macias. Ondo Edu sensed danger early and fled to Gabon but Macias had him extradited and put under house arrest in Malabo. Macias had Ondo Edu killed in early 1969. About the same time, Atanasio Ndongo Miyone, the leader of MONALIGE who had been appointed Foreign Minister at independence, and Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga, another nationalist leader, were arrested on 5 March 1969 on the accusation of plotting to overthrow Macias Nguema. They were subsequently killed. (Liniger-Goumaz 1989:65; Ondo, Camó and Liniger-Goumaz 2002: 2-8)

Foreigners in Equatorial Guinea were not spared of the Macias reign of terror. In February 1969, Macias demanded the removal of Spanish flags flying over the Spanish Consulate in Bata and the withdrawal of the 260 man Spanish

Civil Guard that was left in Equatorial Guinea at independence. As he considered that compliance was slow, he sent men of the National Guard to remove the controversial flags in Bata. In the confusion that followed, a Spanish man was killed at the consulate. The Spanish Ambassador, Juan Duran-Loriga was subsequently recalled. As the face-off went on, Macias accused Franco, the Spanish leader, of trying to re-colonize Equatorial Guinea. Inflammatory broadcasts were made against Spanish nationals, and Equatorial Guinean renegade youths went on a rampage. (Artucio 1980: 5; Fegley 1989: 63-64) Macias also announced that the safety of Spaniards could no longer be guaranteed, and on 1 March 1969 Franco advised Spanish citizens in Rio Muni to seek refuge in the Spanish consulate in Bata. The Spanish government also began to evacuate its nationals from Equatorial Guinea. On 2 March 1969 about five hundred Spaniards left by sea. Other European nationals and American citizens followed suit as Macias declared a state of emergency. By the end of March 1969 only about a hundred or so Europeans were left in Equatorial Guinea of the eight thousand that were in the country at the beginning of the year. (Ministére de la Cooperation 1980:18-20)

As Macias abandoned constitutional provisions and democratic values, he created a paramilitary organisation composed of youths, the *Juventud en Marcha con Macias* (JMM) (Youth on the March with Macias). The organisation was established at Niefang on 22 February 1969 and it was composed mainly of thugs and street urchins who molested people and committed atrocities with impunity. (Sundiata 1990: 101) The organisation eventually became a major arm of the terror machine of Macias. Members of the JMM were at the forefront of the execution of the anti-Spanish campaign of March 1969. The renegade youths targeted individuals perceived to be against the Macias government or just anyone they disagreed with and killed with impunity. Insecurity became one of the most prominent features of the social milieu in Equatorial Guinea as the country quickly degenerated into a totalitarian state. This was one of the first of the many actions that turned Equatorial Guinea to a completely lawless state in the ten years of the Macias Nguema reign of terror..

Macias abolished all the political parties in the country in January 1970 and established the *Partido Unico Nacional* (PUN) which later changed its name to the *Partido Unico Nacional de Trabajadores* (PUNT) (The Unique National Workers Party). This was Macias' party and it was the only one allowed to function. In May 1970, Macias disbanded the Senate and he assumed legislative and judicial powers along with his executive powers. In July 1972, the PUNT declared Macias "President for life, Major General of the Armed Forces and Grand Master of Education, Science and Culture" at its second congress. A new constitution was drawn up in July 1973 that gave all powers to Macias. (Artucio

1980: 5-6) This was accompanied by daily killings of people across the country. So many were murdered in cold blood and several disappeared without trace.

The roll call of the murdered was long indeed. Torao Sikara, a Bubi chief and one of the founders of MONALIGE, was one of the early victims of the Macias political murder. Sikara was a pastor and the only known Bubi leader who campaigned vigorously for union during the constitutional conference which held shortly before Equatorial Guinea's independence in 1968. Pastor Sikara had been appointed president of the *Asamblea de la Republica*, the country's lower house at independence. In the course of 1969 Sikara was arrested and detained in Bata. He was not charged with any offence. He was said to have died of thirst in prison a few months later. It was also during this period that Enriqué Gori Molubuela was arrested and incarcerated. Like Pastor Sikara, Molubuela was a Bubi leader who was first secretary at the foreign ministry. He was said to have been tortured in prison with his eyes gouged out. He eventually died of gangrene (Fegley 1989: 64-65).

Numerous others shared the fate of Molubuela and Sikara. In 1970, Armando Nuñez Balboa Dougan, the Fernandino mayor of Malabo was arrested by the terror machine of Macias. He was said to have died mysteriously in prison. A similar fate befell Nve Ondo Nchama, another Fernandino leader who was then minister of agriculture. He was arrested and killed by Macias' agents. About the same time, Antonio Eworo Obama, former president of the *Idea Popular de Guinea Ecuatorial* (IPGE), was arrested and subsequently disappeared without trace. (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 109-115) Andres Nchuchuma Miko, the civil governor of Rio Muni and Jorge Oma Ekoga, a former deputy, were also among the earliest victims of the Macias tyranny. They were arrested and summarily executed along with Hilario Engura, a civil servant.

Shortly after the execution of the trio, Augustin Eñeso Neñe, a prominent Ndowe leader was arrested. He was then minister of education. His offence was that anti-Macias slogans were found written on blackboards in some schools and it was thought that the minister should not have allowed it. He was subsequently killed in Malabo. A similar fate befell the director of statistics who presented demographic estimates that Macias regarded as too low. The director was promptly murdered in a most gruesome manner and his body cut to pieces to "help him learn to count". "Equatorial Guinea steadily sank into a morass of murder and mayhem," notes Martin Meredith. Various sources indicate that by the time Macias was overthrown in August 1979, about a third of the country's population of 300,000 had either been killed or fled to exile. (Meredith 2006: 239-240) Although it is not possible to establish the accuracy of this figure, what is beyond dispute is that the Macias reign of terror claimed thousand of lives of Equatorial Guineans. Robert Klitgaard draws a similar conclusion in his analysis

of the Macias Nguema dictatorship in his work *Tropical Gangsters* (Klitgaard 1991: 19-20), and the indisputable conclusion is that Equatorial Guinea was in a state of total paralysis at the end of the Macias Nguema terror.

The Macias dictatorship increasingly consumed members of the Macias government in the late 1970s, and the plot to overthrow the government also came from within the inner circle. Macias was eventually overthrown in a military coup led by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema on 3 August 1979. Teodoro Obiang was a lieutenant colonel in the army and a prominent member of the Macias dictatorship. Obiang Nguema promised political reforms on taking office and hopes were high regarding the restoration of democratic values and a stable government. (Liniger-Goumaz, 1989:65) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights helped to draft a new constitution which provided for the abolition of the Supreme Military Council that was in place and the election of a president and parliament. A program of transition to civilian rule was commenced leading to the emergence of a civilian government on 12 October 1982. But the transition program only succeeded in producing Obiang Nguema as president and many were of the view that the elections were not free and fair. (Meredith 2006:681; Africa Elections Database: 2010)

Obiang Nguema and his party, the *Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial* (PDGE), won all the parliamentary and presidential elections from 1982 to 2009 (U.S. Department of State 2009: 4; Africa Elections Database: 2010). All the elections were adjudged to have been characterised by manipulations and harassment of the opposition, and in the 2009 elections, the Convergence for Social Democracy which posed the greatest threat to the PDGE, was especially targeted. (Tran 2009: 1) Obiang also assumed enormous powers and his government has also been extremely repressive. Amnesty International Reports of 1983 and 2009 lamented the frequency of arrest, detention and torture of innocent citizens, and a recent analysis of political developments in Equatorial Guinea stated that "Obiang... has retained many of his uncle's dictatorial practices... In 2003, state radio compared him to God. (Infoplease 2010: 2; Amnesty International 1983:1-7; Amnesty International 2009: 1-3) McSherry similarly noted that: "Human rights groups routinely describe (Obiang) as one of the world's worst dictators, pointing to gross human rights abuses and tight restrictions on civil and political freedoms. (2006: 2) In the atmosphere of dictatorship and repression, many Equatorial Guineans have sought to resist Obiang's oppressive rule. The minority Bubi of Bioko have even established the *Movimiento para la autodeterminacion de la isla de Bioko,* a nationalist and advocacy group to protect the rights of Bioko Island's inhabitants. (Don Pedro 2001; Castro 1998: 428) This is in spite of the relative improvement in their quality of life since the massive inflow of revenue from oil sales in the mid-

1990s . (Highbeam 2001: 1; Liniger-Goumaz 1998: 58-59; U.S. Department of State 2009: 4)

Exploring the Crisis of Democratic Values and Stability in Equatorial Guinea

The analysis above clearly reveals that Equatorial Guinea has experienced the crisis of democratic values and stability throughout the post-independence period. This has been a central issue in the country's political development. The fact is incontrovertible that the political action and erratic approach of Macias Nguema were the single most important factors that destroyed the foundations of Equatorial Guinea's democracy and compromised the country's political stability. After a decade of tyrannical and brutal rule, democratic values entirely disappeared from Equatorial Guinea political life. The level of brutalization and political murder reduced under Obiang Nguema from 1979-2011 but they remained prominent. With a different set of leaders who adopt a different approach to politics and governance, the fortunes of democracy in Equatorial Guinea would surely have been different. The experience of Equatorial Guinea has been similar to that of a number of other countries. As Huntington explains: "Governments that had democratic origins may end democracy by abolishing or severely limiting democratic proceedings, as in Korea and Turkey in the 1950s." (1991: 8) However, the very long time that authoritarianism has persisted in Equatorial Guinea makes the country's political experience worrisome and raises the question of what factors have enhanced undemocratic practice.

An important issue that needs to be examined is that of democratic consciousness and the general attitude of Equatorial Guineans to democratic values. The core of the debate revolves around the question of whether Equatorial Guineans have been passive and unconcerned about the application of democratic principles in the administration of the country or whether there has been a high level of democratic consciousness but popular demand for democratic government has simply not yielded positive result. On this, a curious perspective is presented by Barrie Wharton when he asserts that the positive changes brought to Spanish Guinea by Francisco Franco compared to the backwardness experienced when the Second Republic was in power in Spain made Equatorial Guineans to prefer an administrative structure with a strong leader at the centre. According to Wharton: "Amongst many ordinary Equatorial Guineans, there is a marked nostalgia for a strong leader like Franco as with any right- wing authoritarian regime, they identify individuals and figures with the improvement of their lot. It is this nostalgia and distaste in many ways for democracy of the Second Republic (in Spain) which brought Obiang to power in

1979 and maintained him there since despite repeated opposition attempts to overthrow him, many with foreign help. Many of these attempts have foundered due to lack of mass opposition or real interest." (Wharton 1996: 9-10)

Considering the unusually long time that dictatorship and repression have gone on in Equatorial Guinea, Wharton's argument presented above may appear logical. However, a critical examination of developments in the country reveals a totally different reality. Popular demand for representative government in Equatorial Guinea began with the formation of the first anti-colonial movement, the *Cruzada National de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial*. (CNLGE) in 1947 (Liniger-Goumaz 1988:76-77) The organization enjoyed popular support and drew membership from different parts and ethnic groups across the territory. Although the Spanish colonial authorities brutally suppressed the *Cruzada* even having one its leaders, Acacio Mané killed by men of the *Guardia Colonial*, Equatorial Guineans continued their resistance against repressive colonial policies. (Hélali and Klotchkoff 1999:115-116; Liniger-Goumaz 2000: xxiv) And there was no difference in approach when the Second Republic was in power in Spain and when Franco took over. The same pattern of resistance continued when Spain introduced 'provincialization' in Equatorial Guinea in 1960 which made Spanish possessions in Equatorial Africa overseas territories of Spain. (*Servicio Informativo Español* 1968:120) Franco had tried to justify the perpetuation of colonial rule in Equatorial Guinea by proclaiming 'provincialization'. The pressure on Spain came mainly from the United Nations and anti-colonial movements within the country and the efforts paid off as Spain proclaimed autonomy for Equatorial Guinea's two provinces in 1963 in preparation for total decolonization. (Pélissier 1963:11; Campos 2003: 95-116)

There is no doubt that Obiang Nguema has his supporters in Equatorial Guinea, just as Macias Nguema had his despite his extreme brutalization of the people. This reality, notwithstanding, available evidence reveals that there is a high level of popular democratic consciousness among Equatorial Guineans and the a strong desire for representative government. There has been recourse to violence in some instances and even attempts to forcibly remove the government, some of the most prominent of which took place in 1998 and 2004. (*Afrol News* 2001: 5; Infoplease 2010: 2) In the absence of legitimate democratic institutions, many have resorted to non-formal strategies which involves protests and sometimes violence. What is important in the analysis is that there is nothing to suggest that Equatorial Guineans have displayed a distaste for democracy. The level of repression has been intense, but popular demand for representative government has nevertheless been vigorous.

This leads to the discussion of an important factor that has limited the effectiveness of advocacy for democracy in Equatorial Guinea namely, limited

external support. The fact that periodic elections have held in Equatorial Guinea, at least since 1982, and economic opportunities which have come from the exploitation of oil and gas in the country since the mid-1990s, have made external pressure on the Obiang government somewhat weak and spasmodic (Wood 2004). Considering the fact that the post-independence governments of Equatorial Guinea have been generally impervious to popular demands and protests within the country, external support is critical to success in the restoration of democratic values and stability in the country. There has been some external help, but support has not been sufficiently vigorous for popular pressure to be effective. In his study of popular political participation in Taiwan, Hong Kong and rural China, David Zweig notes that: "International pressure has affected democracy in these three societies... The United States and other countries pushed the Kuomintang (KMT) to liberalize Taiwan's policy in the 1980s ... international support has helped advocates of village democracy to promote village elections, to educate villagers about democratic procedure, and to gain the attention of local governments." (Zweig 2002: 1-2) Political developments in North Africa as well as Cote d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 also confirm the critical importance of external support in political transformation and institutionalization of democracy. This support has been inadequate in Equatorial Guinea and it would be of vital importance in the country's future political transformation.

The exploitation and export of oil and gas which has brought enormous wealth to the small country has been another important factor that has affected political transformation in Equatorial Guinea. The country's economic fortunes became transformed as crude petroleum began to be exported from the mid-1990s. One source notes that Equatorial Guinea's economy grew by a massive 71.2 percent in 1997, the first year of oil export, and between 2002 and 2005, GDP jumped from USD1.27 billion to USD25.69 billion. Although much of the huge earning has been looted by corrupt government officials as revealed in the scandal of 2008 which led to the resignation of the entire government of Prime Minister Ricardo Mangue Obama Nfebua, some of it has been used to develop infrastructure and provide employment and social services. "Obiang has been gradually modernizing the country despite his dictatorial practices", notes one source critical of the repression of the Obiang government. (Infoplease 2010: 3) For a people whose lives the government has hardly ever touched positively, some simply become contented with government 'achievements'. This again emphasises the importance of grassroots political education in the country.

Extensive political education would also be needed to address another factor that has hamstrung the efflorescence of democratic values and stability in Equatorial Guinea: ethnicity. As it is common in Africa, the ethnic factor has

made some to support the dictatorial rulers of Equatorial Guinea. (Ingham 1990) Both Macias and Obiang are of the Fang ethnic group in the Equatorial Guinea's district of Mongomo and their strongest support has come from the area. Some criticism of government's authoritarian policies and actions has come from among the Fang as well, but by far the strongest opposition and most sustained and violent protests have come from other ethnic groups, especially the Fernandino and Ndowe (Liniger-Goumaz 1990: xxxviii).

External support and grassroots political education would be critical to the promotion of democratic values and stability in Equatorial Guinea in the future. The importance of these is emphasised by the reality that Obiang's eldest son, Teodorin, is widely regarded as his possible successor. Should Teodorin succeed Teodoro, then the culture of authoritarianism and corruption will likely continue. In the late 1990s, Teodorin was accused of "financing a lavish lifestyle with his total spending on mansions, exotic cars and other luxury goods in 2004-2009 almost double the 2005 budget for education" (Tran 2009: 1). This makes it difficult to be optimistic about a drastic change for the better in the pattern of politics and governance in Equatorial Guinea soon. It also reveals that there is a lot that would need to change for democratic values and stability to be re-established in Equatorial Guinea.

Conclusion

The structures and institutions that were established to promote representative government in Equatorial Guinea at independence in 1968 crumbled and entirely disappeared under the brutal dictatorship of the country's first president, Francisco Macias Nguema, from 1968-1979. Attempts have been made since 1982 to re-establish structures to promote representative government, but authoritarianism, corruption and repression have persisted in the country. Since independence in 1968, only two individuals from the same family have ruled Equatorial Guinea. Macias Nguema ruled for nearly eleven years, from 1968-1979, and Obiang Nguema has ruled for thirty-three years (since 1979) and still counting. The analysis nevertheless shows that there is a high degree of popular democratic consciousness among Equatorial Guineans, but political action and intense repression have stultified efforts by to promote and expand democratic values. Other factors such as scanty international support for the cause of democracy in Equatorial Guinea, the huge resources and international economic opportunities made possible by the exploitation and export of oil and gas as well as ethnicity have all combined to ensure the perpetuation of dictatorship and repression in the country. These would need to be addressed to restore democratic values to, and ensure democratic stability in Equatorial Guinea.

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BOOK REVIEW
By Stéphane Lefebvre

CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY IN CANADA: NEW VOICES, NEW DIRECTIONS
Edited by Aaron Doyle and Dawn Moore. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011. Pp. x, 320. $34.95.

Introduction

Published in the Law and Society Series of UBC (University of British Columbia) Press, this edited collection will be of interest not only to criminologists but also to legal scholars and sociologists. It brings together a new generation of Canadian criminologists wishing to discuss the most important criminal issues of the day by bringing to the fore insights that mainstream criminology would be unlikely to highlight. They do so using a wide range of socially thought-provoking approaches, including governmentality, anarchism and feminist criminology. The result of their efforts, taken as a whole, points to a critical criminology that could challenge opinionsthat are not solidly held within mainstream criminology, and easily shatter shallow opinions such as hunches and inklings, if only its proponents had a strong voice and an audience beyond the walls of academia. Those with a high-degree of intellectual self-trust situating themselves within mainstream positivist or managerial criminology, or with strong ideological predispositions, may not be so easily convinced, however.[1] As the majority of the chapters have a distinctly Canadian context, I limit my comments to the introductory chapter written by the editors and the overall thrust of the book.

Review

Although the place of critical criminology in Canada remains marginalized, it is probably going to change because of the ongoing and future work of the authors and of the students following in their stead. To their credit, Aaron and Moore, the editors, recognize clearly and forcefully that both mainstream and critical criminologists have more to gain by pulling forces together and recognizing that each can make valuable contributions to our understanding of crime, than by stereotyping and disparaging each other. They also believe that critical criminologists should reach out to mainstream criminologists and that together they could perhaps affect the crime agenda of

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[1] On the issue of self-trust, see RICHARD FOLEY, INTELLECTUAL TRUST IN ONESELF AND OTHERS (2004).

Canada's Conservative government (centered on the building of more prisons and new mandatory minimum sentences for offenders). This activist agenda is motivated by a belief that critical criminology must not limit itself to "trashing" for the sake of "trashing" or "deconstructing" for the sake of "deconstructing," but keep doing what is necessary to "make the justice system somewhat more humane."[2] However, to influence the government agenda on crime, critical (and other) criminologists need a public intellectual place to get their views across. This is hard challenge in Canada as criminologists generally, and critical criminologists in particular, cannot count on like-minded individuals within government (because they have a duty of loyalty to the elected government), think tanks (there are so few of them and, with a few exceptions, they are largely non-influential), parliament (no interest or intellectual capacity to absorb the arguments), and the media (a tough sell). But they are not alone in this situation. Arguably, the challenge of disseminating research results beyond academia for the benefit of society writ large while meeting the academic publishing standards required for promotion and tenure is one that all academics are facing.[3]

However, before critical criminologists can effectively address their public communication problem, they have first to cross traditional disciplinary lines as well as criminology's sub-disciplinary divides and join forces with all intellectuals sharing similar concerns as theirs. More importantly, if critical criminologists are to engage in public debates to influence and shape the practice of criminology and government policies, they need to make explicit the ultimate good (or truth claims) they are promoting. If critical criminologies are defined, as Doyle and Moore conclude their introductory chapter, by an "urgent sense of social justice,"[4] it behooves them to explicitly define what their notion of social justice is and why they are espousing that notion and not another. If the subject of critical criminologies is represented by the marginalized people, and if the primary problem addressed by critical criminologies is the effect of criminal (in)justice on these people, then would not critical criminology fight for equal opportunities and egalitarian justice (so that factors such as race, gender, employment status, financial circumstances and social status are neutralized)? Or should critical criminology instead favor a different treatment for marginalized people to account for natural and/or socio-economic inequalities between

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[2] Aaron Doyle and Dawn Moore, *Introduction: Questions for a New Generation of Criminologists, in* CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY IN CANADA: NEW VOICES, NEW DIRECTIONS 20 (Aaron Doyle & Dawn Moore, eds. 2011).

[3] *Id.* at 19, 20.

[4] *Id.* at 21.

peoples?[5] And what about the victims of crime? Are they not also in need of social justice and justified in seeking redress?[6] While Doyle's and Moore's definition of criminology is simple and parsimonious ("the academic study of 'crime' and social and government reactions to it"[7]), their definition of critical criminology is not as clearly stated and I wonder if they are not leaving something out. Would social reactions to crime include those of victims? In other words, if critical criminologists are "concerned with researching and theorizing power relations in crime and criminalization, power relations that lead to social injustice," are they also concerned with social justice owed to victims of crime? If not, why? There are certainly issues of ethics and morality associated with victims wanting those who victimized them to be punished. How are issues of ethics and morality from the victims' point of view being taken into account by critical criminologies? Is not the criminal justice system also harmful, counterproductive and unjust to victims of crime? If so, I did not get a strong sense of it. In my opinion, the underlying tone of Doyle's and Moore's argument seems to be an overarching preoccupation with those punished by the state. While they are absolutely right in pointing out that there are often pitfalls and harmful effects on the part of the criminal justice system on those convicted

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[5] For an extensive discussion on the pursuit of egalitarian justice, see LESLEY A. JACOBS, PURSUING EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE (2004). On the conceptualization of the problem of inequalities in society, see MARY ROMERO AND ERIC MARGOLIS, EDS, THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL INEQUALITIES (2005). For an overview of inequalities and justice in Canada, see BARBARA PERRY, ED, DIVERSITY, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN CANADA (2011).

[6] For a Foucauldian perspective on the victim in criminal law and justice, see TYRONE KIRCHENGAST, THE VICTIM IN CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE (2005). With respect to redress, this could include seeing perpetrators of the most heinous crimes being brought to justice, a cause espoused by The Canadian Centre for International Justice (CCIJ). See the CCIJ site at http://www.ccij.ca/index-e.php.

[7] Aaron and Doyle, *supra* note 1 at 3. A more comprehensive definition that perhaps gives a better sense of the variety of the research being conducted in the field of criminology is provided by Nicola Lacey, "Criminology concerns itself with social and individual antecedents of crime and with the nature of crime as a social phenomenon: its disciplinary resources come mainly from sociology, social theory, psychology, history, and, though more rarely, economics and political science. Criminologists raise a variety of questions about patterns of criminality and its social construction, along with their historical, economic, political, and social conditions of existence." Lacey, *Legal Constructions of Crime, in* OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 180 (Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, eds, 2007).

justly or wrongly of a crime, I question whether they give a sufficient voice to the third party in any crime, the victim.[8]

On the location of criminology, Doyle and Moore comment that many Canadian critical criminologists negatively see a close alignment (whatever that means is not made clear) of their American counterparts with the criminal justice system. The reasons why may not need to be fully spelled out, but there are unacknowledged benefits which they inexplicably ignore. Besides the fact that there are no objective reasons to treat those working within the criminal justice system as bad, immoral, unethical, untrustworthy, or of being undeserving of dialoguing with, there are evidently benefits to be reaped from engaging with them. They are a source of primary knowledge on conditions to be encountered within the criminal justice system. They are also a source of primary knowledge on the rationale behind particular policies, and they own a significant amount of data (notwithstanding problems associated with all government collected data) necessary to properly assess any elements of the criminal justice system. Accessing that knowledge and data need not compromise the academic freedom of anyone. Critical criminologists who seriously believe they can theorize without fully comprehending what they are dealing with by cutting themselves of a key actor in the study of crime are probably deluding themselves in believing they really have an understanding of what they are talking about. Interacting with components of the criminal justice system does not require that one loose his or her sense of objectivity. If critical criminology really aspires to influence and shape government policies in order to reduce social injustice, then its proponents are better to fully understand who they are trying to influence, what and how they think, and make sense of the data they are using.

With respect to theoretical influences, Doyle and Moore note the attraction to European theory, and in particular the work of Michel Foucault. Interestingly, they make no mention of the place of critical criminology within the larger field of critical legal studies (CLS), despite a connection around the use of social theory and the aspirations to reverse inequalities.[9] Notwithstanding the approach taken, critical criminologies and their call to activism is not dissimilar to the call to activism of critical legal theorists of the 1970s and their

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[8] I would argue that MaDonna Maidment is making a serious "critical" effort in this direction in her book WHEN JUSTICE IS A GAME: UNRAVELLING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA (2009).

[9] On the origins of critical legal studies, see ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) and MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). MARK TEBBIT offers a useful survey of CLS in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2005) at 70-88.

notion that, ultimately, "law is politics."[10] CLS made lots of policy proposals.[11] Are there any lessons that could be learned from their experience of public engagement? While critical criminology has had difficulties establishing itself within the field of criminology, has it also been the case within the CLS sub-field?[12] Besides the influence of Michel Foucault, have any critical legal thinkers influenced critical criminology? If not, how can we explain it? I also wonder what to make of criminal anthropology. Is it of critical criminology or distinct from it? Both seem to be heavily influenced—so it seems now with respect to criminal anthropology – by Foucault.[13] I think that it would have been useful to the reader if Doyle and Moore had expanded on how the various critical criminologies they allude to differ from one another, and where to situate critical criminology within the wider social theory enterprise.

Aaron and Doyle enthusiastically note an accrued interest in criminology on the part of students pursuing university education, and in that regard refer to the television show CSI as a possible influence for this trend. While an interesting remark, it is anecdotal and references to studies addressing the portrayal of crime in art and its social effects would have been useful and more appropriate.[14]

Certainly, what Doyle and Moore, and all of their authors, do extremely well is to be reflexive and accessible. Despite what I suspect are very strong convictions that critical criminology is especially useful and potentially game changing, none of the contributors to this volume are out there trying to convince anyone that theirs is the only approach to adopt. They are in fact quite clear that there are different ways of understanding the criminal justice system. In that sense they appear to deny monism,[15] but I suspect that not all critical

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[10] Slogan from David Kayris quoted by Mark V. Tushnet, *Critical Legal Theory* in MARTIN P. GOLDING & WILLIAM A. EDMUNSON, EDS, THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (2005) at 80.

[11] *Id.* at 85.

[12] For a brief discussion of the CSL and criminal law, see ANDREW HALPIN, DEFINITION IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2004) at 43-72.

[13] See, *inter alia*, David G. Horn, *Performing Criminal Anthropology: Science, Popular Wisdom, and the Body* in JONATHAN XAVIER INDA, ED, ANTHROPOLOGIES OF MODERNITY: FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND LIFE POLITICS (2005) at 135.

[14] See, *inter alia*, LESLIE KANE, ED, THE ART OF CRIME: THE PLAYS AND FILMS OF HAROLD PINTER AND DAVID MAMET (2004) and AUSTIN SARAT, LAWRENCE DOUGLAS & MARTHA MERRIL UMPHREY, EDS, LAW ON THE SCREEN (2005). On the CSI effect on the perception of science in law in particular, see DAVID S. CAUDILL, STORIES ABOUT SCIENCE IN LAW: LITERARY AND HISTORICAL IMAGES OF ACQUIRED EXPERTISE (2011) at 70, 79.

[15]In the sense that "in any given area or on any given topic, there can be no more than one correct opinion, judgement, or norm." MARIA BAGHRAMIAN, RELATIVISM (2004).

criminologists would necessarily share that viewpoint. That said, to instill critical thinking I believe that critical criminology is probably a very valuable approach and has therefore to be part of the criminology curriculum, as it increasingly is in Canada.